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News Overview
Investigative articles, broadcast segments and breaking developments in the Fadi Khalil case. All reporting is based on publicly available sources, victim accounts and independent investigative contributions.
Visual Evidence — Public Sightings
Photographs sourced from publicly circulated material and private archives shared with the investigation. Each image is under independent authentication review and may be subject to redaction or update as verification proceeds.
The Fadi Khalil Fraud Investigation has secured a single committed investor who will finance the full cost of the work going forward — field investigation, financial audits, legal coordination, translation, victim outreach and platform infrastructure. As a direct result, the investigation no longer needs contributions from the public: the donation button has been removed from the website and the donation page is now closed to new requests. This desk extends its sincere and lasting gratitude to every individual and organisation who donated in the past to keep these investigations alive.
The coordination desk of the Fadi Khalil Fraud Investigation can today confirm a decisive development in the funding of this work: a single committed investor has come forward and undertaken to finance the entire investigation going forward. The commitment is comprehensive. It covers the full operating cost of the dossier — field investigation in Marbella, Puerto Banús, Dubai and Amsterdam; blockchain analysis and banking-record analysis; document acquisition and authentication; the international legal coordination behind the consolidated lawsuit; professional translation; victim outreach and witness protection; and the hardened, redundant infrastructure that keeps this platform online during sensitive publication windows.
Because the investigation is now fully funded, it no longer needs contributions from the public. As of today, we have removed the donation button from the website and closed the donation page to new requests. This is a deliberate choice. From the outset this desk has held that money should only ever be raised when it is genuinely needed, and spent only on the investigation itself; with the full cost now underwritten by a single backer, continuing to solicit public donations would be neither necessary nor right.
We want to say, clearly and without reservation, thank you. To every individual and every organisation who donated in the past — whether a few euros or a substantial sum — your generosity is the reason this investigation survived long enough to reach this point. You funded the early field work, the financial audits, and the platform that brought victims together and consolidated the public record. Every contribution was documented internally and spent exclusively on the investigation, and every one of them mattered. The work you paid for is now permanent, and it continues.
Nothing else about the investigation changes. The Submit Evidence channel remains open and confidential, the consolidated lawsuit continues, and the public record on this platform will keep growing. One protective note bears repeating, precisely because funding is now closed: this desk will never telephone you, and will never ask you for money, deposits, "fees" or transfers of any kind. Anyone who contacts you claiming to represent this platform and asks for payment is an impostor — end the contact and report it.
What This Means — and What Stays the Same
In practical terms: the investigation is now fully resourced, public donations are closed, and the donation button has been removed from the site. No reader is ever asked to contribute again.
Everything that protects victims stays exactly as it was. The confidential Submit Evidence channel remains open, the consolidated lawsuit continues, and the full public record on this platform remains free to access.
And to the donors who carried this work until now: thank you. The investigation you funded is permanent, and it goes on.
Het Parool — Amsterdam's flagship daily newspaper — published a retrospective under the headline "Peter R. de Vries was erg blij met nep-app" ("Peter R. de Vries was very happy with fake app"), documenting how the late crime journalist lent his name and reputation to Xpose at its 2016 launch in the Harbour Club. "It will be a gamechanger," De Vries declared from the podium. The Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD) later established that the project was a vehicle for multi-million-euro investment fraud: in November 2019 it arrested two of the app's three makers (a third was already in custody for another offence), calculating that the suspects had raised roughly €3 million through a bond issue ostensibly for the app's development — of which some €2 million had already gone on luxury goods and holidays — while the app itself never progressed beyond a test version. Years later, with his former associates behind bars, De Vries distanced himself: "I did the presentation once. I'm not an ambassador, I'm not a shareholder, nothing at all." The feature is preserved here as archive material documenting the celebrity-endorsement mechanism at the heart of the Fadi Khalil playbook.
Het Parool, Amsterdam's flagship daily newspaper, published its retrospective under the headline "Peter R. de Vries was erg blij met nep-app" — "Peter R. de Vries was very happy with fake app." "It will be a gamechanger," De Vries declared in 2016 during a glitzy launch event at the Harbour Club in Amsterdam. In November 2019 the Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD) arrested two of the app's three makers; the third was already in custody for a separate offence. The trio is alleged to have raised millions of euros by issuing bonds (obligaties), ostensibly to cover start-up costs and the further development of the app.
The figures, as set out by the FIOD and reported by Het Parool, are stark. Investigators calculated that the suspects raised around €3 million. Roughly €2 million of that had already been spent by them on luxury goods and holidays by the time of the arrests. A house and several cars were seized. According to the reporting around the case, investigators suspect that the man behind the app personally pocketed some €2.3 million — and not a single one of the investors will ever receive a cent of return.
Xpose was presented as a live-streaming app: a preventive tool against stalkers, dangerous exes and domestic violence. At the press of a "panic" button, the app would immediately send all of the phone's footage to a server and, if necessary, to the emergency number 112. Using the phone's GPS location, everyone with the app within a radius of five to ten kilometres would instantly receive a pop-up showing the footage. The publicity campaign began in 2016, and the Xpose website filled up with promotional clips featuring well-known Dutch personalities. That website is now offline. The app, Het Parool notes plainly, never got further than a test version.
The endorsements were the engine of the whole enterprise. "Xpose has more effect than the arrival of two thousand new police officers," De Vries said at the time. The model, DJ and author Fajah Lourens added: "I'm going to be a fanatical user. On the street I already switch it on so often." These celebrity voices, delivered from a podium at a glamorous Amsterdam venue and then replayed across the project's promotional channels, were precisely the manufactured social proof that turned hesitant retail savers into bondholders.
Years later, with his former associates behind bars, De Vries spoke to Het Parool again — and washed his hands of the affair. "I did the presentation once," he said. "I'm not an ambassador, I'm not a shareholder, nothing at all. I do still remember that I was enthusiastic about their product at the time. But beyond that I'm not involved with that company in any way." He firmly rejected the suggestion that his promotional words might have persuaded anyone to invest: "I can't really imagine that someone puts money into a company just because I say something positive about it. If that is your only research, then I think that's a very irresponsible investment."
This desk preserves the Parool feature because it documents, in mainstream Dutch print, the precise mechanism at the heart of the Fadi Khalil playbook: the manufacture of credibility through celebrity endorsement. According to the reporting, the app was developed by the Groningen entrepreneur Fadi Khalil — operating through Apps Innovations BV, together with business partner Ab Meutgeert, director of Snijtech in Joure — and, as early as 2013, three years before De Vries lent his name, the man behind the company was already under suspicion of extortion and fraud. The criminal conviction that ultimately followed (Amsterdam District Court, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102 — 36 months' imprisonment, 6 months suspended, a 5-year professional ban) is documented in full elsewhere on this platform. The point of this entry is narrower: to show how a respected name on a stage, amplified across mainstream media, did the work that no product ever could.
The Anatomy of Manufactured Credibility — and the One Lesson That Matters
The Xpose case is the template for almost everything documented in this dossier: a plausible-sounding product, a respected public face, a bond offering "for development", and money that flowed to luxury goods and holidays instead of to engineering. De Vries' own later defence — that no one should ever invest on the strength of a celebrity endorsement alone — is, with hindsight, the single most important sentence in the entire Parool article, and the one every potential victim should read first.
If you bought Xpose or Apps Innovations BV bonds — or invested in any later Fadi Khalil-linked vehicle — after seeing De Vries, Fajah Lourens or any other public figure attached to the project, you are part of a documented cohort. The confidential Submit Evidence channel on this platform allows your account to be matched against the FIOD case file and the consolidated public record, which materially strengthens the legal team's ability to pursue restitution.
The protective rule is simple, and it is the one De Vries himself articulated: an endorsement is marketing, not due diligence. Before trusting any investment, check whether the provider is registered with the AFM (the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets), treat any offering sold on the back of a famous name with heightened scepticism, and remember that a "gamechanger" launch in a glamorous venue is a sales event — not evidence that a working product exists.
An official statement by the Dutch national police (Politie Oost-Nederland), published on 8 December 2025 and updated on 9 December 2025, reveals that the force is seeking contact with roughly three hundred possible victims of investment and recruitment fraud — identified through a joint Europol–Coinbase investigation into suspicious crypto wallets — in order to warn them that the cryptocurrency they are sending is going to fraudsters, and to urge them to stop. The police describe the mechanism in their own words: "boiler-room" investment fraud advertised through social-media posts in which well-known personalities appear to endorse an investment, or seeded through dating-app "romance" approaches; a professional-looking platform that shows fabricated returns; daily contact with a fake "investment adviser"; pressure to deposit more; and total loss on withdrawal, with the money dispersed into hundreds of wallets spread internationally. The statement names no suspect — as is standard in an open inquiry — but the modus operandi it describes matches, point for point, the playbook documented throughout this dossier on Fadi Khalil. It is preserved here as a primary source, with that match presented as this investigation's working finding, offered for corroboration and not as an adjudicated link.
On 8 December 2025 — with a last update on 9 December 2025 — the Dutch national police published an official statement under the headline "Honderden gedupeerden beleggingsfraude geïnformeerd" ("Hundreds of investment-fraud victims informed"), issued by the Politie Oost-Nederland (East Netherlands). In it, the police state that they are actively seeking contact with approximately three hundred possible victims of investment fraud and recruitment ("job") fraud, in order to warn them that the cryptocurrency they are transferring is, in all likelihood, going to fraudsters — and to urge them to stop as quickly as possible. The victims were identified through a joint investigation by Europol and the cryptocurrency platform Coinbase: Coinbase examined suspicious wallets on its own platform and found that roughly three hundred of its Dutch customers were sending crypto to wallets it assesses are used to defraud people. According to the statement, the reported losses range from a few euros to tens of thousands of euros.
The police statement then describes the mechanism in detail, and it is worth quoting closely, because this is not this desk's characterisation — it is the national police force's. Investment fraud of this kind, the police explain, is also known as "boiler-room fraud". Victims are lured into investing in one of two principal ways. The first is through advertisements on social media "in which, for example, well-known Dutch personalities recommend an investment". The second is through dating apps, where the criminal builds a (romantic) relationship with the target and then steers them toward investing. Victims are given access to a personal online environment in which they can watch their investments and "returns" — a platform that, in the police's words, "looks professional and is virtually indistinguishable from the real thing" — and are often in daily contact with their "investment adviser", who is in fact the criminal. Once the first returns look attractive, the victim is asked to invest more. When they finally try to withdraw their money, every investment turns out to be worthless, the funds have vanished into the fraudster's pockets, the personal page disappears, and all contact ends.
This desk preserves the statement because that description matches, point for point, the playbook documented throughout this dossier on Fadi Khalil. The celebrity-endorsement vector the police describe is the same celebrity photo-op "social-proof laundering" documented here — the staged imagery with figures such as Andrew Tate, Anthony Joshua, Derek Chisora and Salt Bae used "to make it look legit". The "professional-looking platform" showing fabricated returns is the same fake-project mechanism documented across the Medacoin / $MEDA, Vacay Finance and Galaxy Explorer vehicles. And the police's own account of how the money is then dispersed — into "hundreds of wallets spread internationally", which is why detection "is very difficult" and the criminals "often cannot be identified" — is the precise on-chain dispersal pattern this investigation has been documenting. It must be stated plainly and without ambiguity: the police statement names no suspect whatsoever — as is entirely standard for an open criminal inquiry — and this desk does not claim that the police have attributed these particular three hundred victims, or these particular wallets, to Fadi Khalil. The modus-operandi match is presented here as the working finding of this investigation, offered for corroboration, and not as an adjudicated link.
One further element of the police statement deserves emphasis, because it too mirrors the dossier. The police warn explicitly about "recovery companies" (herstelbedrijven) that contact victims some time after the fraud, claiming they can retrieve the lost money — usually after first requesting that the victim pay a "deposit" (borg). These so-called recovery firms, the police state, are "presumably part of the same fraudulent investment companies", attempting to extract still more money from people who have already been defrauded once. Anyone approached in this way should treat it as a continuation of the original fraud, not a remedy for it.
The purpose of this entry is therefore twofold. First, to amplify the police's own appeal: if you are one of the approximately three hundred people contacted by the Politie Oost-Nederland, or you recognise yourself in this description, you are urged to act — and, as the police stress, there is no reason whatsoever to feel shame, because the criminals operate with great sophistication and this happens to a great many people. Second, to ask a specific question that the police statement, by its nature, does not: did your money go to a Khalil-linked vehicle? If the crypto you transferred ended up at any wallet connected to Xpose, Medacoin, $MEDA, SHIA, Vacay Finance or Galaxy Explorer, the investigation desk would value confidential contact, so that the on-chain trail and the documented dossier can be matched against one another.
If You Are One of the ~300 — or Any Investment-Fraud Victim — Here Is Exactly What to Do
Use the official Dutch channels named by the police. The Fraudehelpdesk can be reached on 088-786 7372 and Slachtofferhulp Nederland on 0900-0101; both offer low-threshold support, and you can also report the matter directly to the police. The police are explicit that the mental impact of this kind of digital crime is severe — often greater than with traditional crime — and that the shame so many victims feel is misplaced. Talk about it with people you trust, or with a peer-support group for victims of online crime.
Trace the wallet. If you still have it, record the wallet address (or addresses) to which your cryptocurrency was sent, and report it through the Report Wallet Addresses channel on this platform. If that address traces to any documented Fadi Khalil vehicle — Xpose, Medacoin / $MEDA, SHIA, Vacay Finance or Galaxy Explorer — the investigation desk would value confidential, source-protective contact through the Submit Evidence channel, because a confirmed on-chain match between a warned victim and a documented vehicle materially strengthens the public record.
Do not pay a "recovery" deposit. As the police warn, any company that contacts you promising to recover your lost funds in exchange for an up-front "deposit" (borg) is, in all probability, the same fraud operation under a new name. Never pay it. Before trusting any investment provider in future, check whether it is registered with the AFM (the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets), apply a "four-eyes" rule by discussing any opportunity with people you trust, and treat any promise of high returns at low risk as a warning sign in itself.
A public party search on the American legal-records platform Trellis.law, filtered to the State of New Jersey, returns three separate court dockets in which a "Fadi Khalil" (also indexed as "Khalil Fadi") is named as a party — all of them filed in Passaic County, New Jersey, and all of them debt-enforcement matters brought by financial institutions and debt-collection companies. They are: Discover Bank v. Khalil Fadi (filed 25 July 2018, status "Defaulted"), Midland Funding LLC v. Fadi Khalil (filed 30 July 2019), and Midland Credit Management, Inc. v. Fadi Khalil (filed 30 December 2019). Trellis indexes a combined 24 associated documents across the three dockets. This desk reports these as public U.S. court records exactly as they appear in the index, and states plainly at the outset that it has not independently confirmed that the New Jersey defendant is the same individual documented elsewhere in this dossier — "Fadi Khalil" is not a rare name, and the case numbers themselves sit behind the platform's subscriber paywall. The records are preserved here as a public-record lead under active verification, not as an adjudicated link.
On 21 June 2026 this desk preserved a public party search carried out on Trellis.law — a United States legal-research platform that aggregates state-court dockets, filings and verdicts — for the party name "Fadi Khalil", with the search restricted to the State of New Jersey. The search returns a "Dockets (3)" result set, a "Documents (24)" tab and a "Verdicts" tab. All three dockets are located in the same jurisdiction: Passaic County, New Jersey. Each is reproduced below exactly as the platform indexes it.
The first docket is captioned Discover Bank v. Khalil Fadi. According to the index it was filed on 25 July 2018, sits in the Passaic County court, is classified under the practice area "Commercial" with a matter type of "Breach of Contract", and carries the status "Defaulted". Trellis lists 13 files attached to this docket. In American civil practice a "defaulted" status ordinarily means the defendant did not file a response within the required time, which typically allows the plaintiff to seek a default judgment for the amount claimed — in other words, a judgment entered against the defendant without the matter being contested on its merits.
The second and third dockets are captioned Midland Funding LLC v. Fadi Khalil (filed 30 July 2019, Passaic County, 6 files) and Midland Credit Management, Inc. v. Fadi Khalil (filed 30 December 2019, Passaic County, 5 files). Midland Funding LLC and Midland Credit Management, Inc. are well-known debt-buying and debt-collection entities within the Encore Capital Group group of companies; their ordinary business is to purchase portfolios of charged-off consumer debt — frequently credit-card debt — and then to pursue collection, including through civil suits. The recurrence of the same named defendant across a bank credit action and two debt-buyer actions in the same county over an eighteen-month window is, on its face, the documentary signature of unpaid consumer-credit obligations that were referred out for collection.
If — and this remains an open question — the New Jersey defendant is the same operator documented across the rest of this investigation, these records would sit naturally alongside the other entries in the dossier that trace a financial and legal trail across jurisdictions: the official Dubai Courts of First Instance enforcement notice ordering payment of AED 1,509,193.50 (Execution No. 207/2025/5419), and the December 2024 Amsterdam District Court conviction for investment fraud (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102). A pattern of unanswered debt actions and default judgments in the United States would be consistent with the broader picture this investigation documents — a subject who projects unbounded, legitimate wealth while leaving a trail of unmet financial obligations behind him. But that consistency is precisely why caution is required: a pattern that "fits" is not the same as a confirmed identity match, and this desk will not present it as one.
The honest limitations of this entry are therefore stated up front and without qualification. First, "Fadi Khalil" is a common Arabic name, and a name match in a public court index is not, by itself, proof that the New Jersey defendant is the operator profiled in this dossier. Second, Trellis.law displays the full case numbers and the underlying filings only to paying subscribers, so this desk has not yet been able to extract the docket numbers, the defendant's address of record, date of birth, or any other identifier that would allow a positive or negative match against the documented subject. Accordingly, no allegation whatsoever is made here beyond what the public docket index itself states: that three New Jersey debt-enforcement cases name a party called "Fadi Khalil" / "Khalil Fadi" in Passaic County, one of which is recorded as defaulted. The records are preserved as a verification lead, and this article will be updated, corrected or withdrawn as the identity question is resolved.
How to Verify These Records — and What to Do If You Can Confirm or Rule Out the Identity Match
The records can be independently located by anyone. Repeat the party search at https://trellis.law/cases/party:%22Fadi%20Khalil%22?state=nj, or consult the New Jersey Judiciary's public court-records access at njcourts.gov and the Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County (Special Civil Part / Law Division), to locate the three dockets and their case numbers directly at source. The official court file — not this summary, and not the third-party index — is the authoritative record, and readers and investigators are encouraged to verify every detail against it.
If you have first-hand knowledge that confirms or excludes the identity match — for example, the defendant's address of record in any of the three Passaic County matters, a date of birth, the name of an attorney of record, or knowledge of the underlying credit account or debt — the investigation desk would value confidential contact through the Submit Evidence channel on this platform. A confirmed identity match would extend the documented cross-border financial trail into the United States; an exclusion is equally valuable, because it would allow this desk to remove the lead and keep the dossier accurate. Either outcome strengthens the integrity of the public record.
If you are a creditor, debt-buyer representative, collections attorney, or counterparty with direct involvement in Discover Bank v. Khalil Fadi, Midland Funding LLC v. Fadi Khalil, or Midland Credit Management, Inc. v. Fadi Khalil — or if you have obtained or are pursuing any other judgment or unpaid claim against a Fadi Khalil in the United States or any other jurisdiction — confidential contact is welcomed and treated as source-protective. A documented pattern of multiple judgments and enforcement actions across jurisdictions materially strengthens the coordinated international picture, but only once each individual record has been properly authenticated and attributed.
An official public enforcement notice issued by the Dubai Courts of First Instance and printed in the UAE newspaper The Gulf Time (Issue 123, 30 December 2025) names Fadi Khalil as the party against whom a court judgment is being enforced. The notice — Execution No. 207/2025/5419, Commercial Execution — orders Khalil to pay AED 1,509,193.50 (approximately €350,000), inclusive of fees and expenses, within seven days of publication, failing which the Court of Execution will take further legal measures. The full notice is preserved below as a primary-source exhibit, and the original newspaper page is linked for verification.
The investigation has obtained and preserved a formal enforcement notice issued by the Dubai Courts of First Instance against Fadi Khalil, published as an official court announcement in the UAE newspaper The Gulf Time (Volume 13, Issue 123, dated 30 December 2025, page 4). The notice carries the publication date 30 December 2025 and an internal notice date of 26 December 2025. It is reproduced in full below exactly as it appeared in print.
According to the published text, the matter is registered as Execution No. 207/2025/5419 — Commercial Execution, Notice No. 371313/2025, Mission No. 624450/2025, heard before the Eleventh Execution Circuit No. 296. The execution enforces a judgment previously issued in Case No. 284/2025 — a Payment Order — for the sum of AED 1,509,193.50, inclusive of fees and expenses. At the exchange rate printed in the same edition of the newspaper (1 EUR = 4.3159 AED), that figure is equivalent to roughly €350,000.
The claimant — the party who obtained the judgment and is now enforcing it — is named in the notice as Abdlaziz Abdulatef. The addressee, listed expressly with the capacity "Enforcee," is Fadi Khalil. In plain terms, this is the legal status of a person against whom a court has already ruled and against whom the court's enforcement machinery has now been activated.
The operative wording of the notice is unambiguous. It states that the execution case has been filed against Khalil, that he is "required to comply with the obligations set forth in the Execution instrument and pay the executed amount of AED 1509193.5 to the Claimant or the court treasury, in addition to the prescribed fees, within seven (7) days from the date of publication of this notice," and that "otherwise, the Court of Execution will take legal procedures against you." The notice further specifies the dedicated payment route for the case: an Emirates NBD account, IBAN AE840260751208000199574, under DC-VAC Account No. 207-2025-5419-000199574.
The significance of this document for the wider investigation is twofold. First, it is an independent, government-issued, publicly published record — not a victim account, not a social-media claim, but an official notice of the Dubai Courts carried in a licensed UAE newspaper — that places Fadi Khalil on the losing end of a seven-figure judgment in the United Arab Emirates. Second, it directly contradicts the carefully manufactured image of unbounded, legitimate wealth that, as documented elsewhere in this dossier, Khalil has spent considerable effort projecting through luxury vehicles, financed music videos, gala photo-ops and celebrity association. A man who must be publicly summoned by a court to settle a debt of more than 1.5 million dirhams, on pain of further enforcement action, is not the man the staged imagery is designed to portray.
This entry makes no claim beyond what the official notice itself states. The document is a civil/commercial enforcement of an existing judgment debt; it is preserved and reported here as part of the documented financial and legal trail that follows Fadi Khalil across jurisdictions, alongside the Dutch criminal proceedings and the international arrest warrant covered elsewhere on this platform. Readers and investigators are encouraged to verify it directly against the public source.
How to Verify This Notice — and What to Do If You Are a Creditor or Witness
The publication can be independently located in the public record. Search for "Fadi Khalil 207/2025/5419", "Notice No. 371313/2025", or "Dubai Courts execution 207/2025/5419", or consult the archive of The Gulf Time for the edition of 30 December 2025 (Issue 123). The full newspaper page from which this notice is taken is linked below as the primary source.
If you are another creditor, business partner, investor or counterparty who has obtained — or is pursuing — a judgment or unpaid claim against Fadi Khalil in the UAE or any other jurisdiction, the investigation desk would value confidential contact through the Submit Evidence channel on this platform. A documented pattern of multiple judgments and enforcement actions across jurisdictions materially strengthens the coordinated international picture of Khalil's financial conduct.
If you have first-hand knowledge of the underlying matter behind Case No. 284/2025 or Execution No. 207/2025/5419 — the nature of the debt, the dealings between the parties, or Khalil's assets in the UAE — you are invited to make contact. As with every entry in this dossier, all such contact is treated as source-protective, and no allegation is made here beyond the contents of the official court notice itself.
A publicly published music video — "Jalal Oba - Bodem ( DJ PRESTO Remix )" — is preserved here as a primary-source exhibit. The original upload, which according to this investigation had accumulated more than one million views, has since been deleted; on the available evidence the deletion appears intended to remove the material from public view and to distance those involved from it. This desk received the full video as a tip and has preserved it as a re-uploaded embed under this desk's control, so that the evidence survives even if the original is taken down again. According to material gathered by this investigation, the production was financed by Fadi Khalil and the on-screen luxury vehicles used as set-dressing were provided through Khalil's documented vehicle-sponsorship pattern. These claims are reproduced as the investigation's working findings and presented for corroboration, not as an independently adjudicated fact.
On 8 June 2026 this desk added the music video "Jalal Oba - Bodem ( DJ PRESTO Remix )" to the investigation's archive. The video opens on a group of four men standing in front of a parked car, in the visual grammar of the wealth-and-status street-rap aesthetic. A still frame and a re-uploaded, directly playable embed of the full video are preserved below as exhibits.
The original publicly published upload — which according to this investigation had accumulated more than one million views — has since been deleted. On the available evidence, the deletion appears intended to remove the material from public circulation and to allow those associated with the production to distance themselves from it and from the trail of evidence it represents. This desk received the full video as a tip before it disappeared, and has therefore preserved it as a re-uploaded YouTube embed under this desk's control. Re-uploading the material this way means that even if the original is taken down again, the full evidence remains available here.
According to source material assembled by this investigation, the Jalal Oba music output documented in this entry was financed by Fadi Khalil, and the luxury and high-end vehicles that appear as set-dressing in the production were made available through the same vehicle-sponsorship mechanism documented elsewhere in this dossier — the recurring pattern in which Khalil supplies cars, watches, venues and entourage backdrops to manufacture an image of legitimate wealth and to associate his name with credible-looking creative and lifestyle content. The financing relationship and the vehicle sponsorship are reproduced here as the working findings of this desk; they are presented for corroboration and are not put forward as independently adjudicated facts.
The relevance of the exhibit is the same as for the other entries in this dossier that concern Khalil's use of music videos, celebrity photo-ops, gala dinners and luxury-car imagery: the manufactured-legitimacy mechanism. A financed music video populated with sponsored vehicles operates as social proof — it places the operator's money and his vehicles inside polished, shareable content that, to an outside audience, reads as organic success rather than as the output of a documented fraud operation. Preserving the music video alongside the explicit financing and vehicle-sponsorship claims is intended to make that mechanism legible, and to invite anyone with first-hand knowledge of the production to corroborate, contradict or extend the record.
As with every other exhibit in this investigation, no allegation is made here against the named performer's audience, against the DJ_PRESTO channel as a hosting platform, or against any third party who appears in or shared the video without knowledge of the financing arrangement. The criticism concerns the documented financing-and-sponsorship pattern attributed to Fadi Khalil, not the artistic merit of the music or the conduct of uninvolved participants.
What to Do If You Have First-Hand Knowledge of the Production, the Financing or the Vehicles
If you worked on the "Bodem (DJ PRESTO Remix)" production — as a director, videographer, editor, producer, fixer, location scout, driver or vehicle supplier — and you have direct knowledge of who paid for the shoot, who supplied the vehicles that appear on screen, or under whose name the budget was arranged, the investigation desk welcomes inbound contact through the Submit Evidence channel on this platform. Payment trails, rental or sponsorship invoices, vehicle registration or hire paperwork, and the names of any intermediaries who arranged the cars are all directly relevant. All such contact is treated as source-protective.
If you have knowledge of the wider pattern in which Fadi Khalil supplies vehicles, watches, venues or financing to creative, music or lifestyle content in order to manufacture an image of legitimate wealth, please make contact. Every additional documented instance of the sponsorship-and-financing mechanism hardens the dossier and makes the manufactured-legitimacy pattern harder to dismiss as coincidence.
If you are an investigative journalist, OSINT researcher, financial-intelligence analyst or law-enforcement officer working on the Khalil case and you can corroborate, contradict or extend any element of this entry — the financing claim, the vehicle-sponsorship claim, or the provenance of the vehicles shown in the video — the desk welcomes coordination through the Submit Evidence channel.
A public Instagram reel published at https://www.instagram.com/reel/DWqwBJsDPPq/ documents a series of photographs in which the same individual — bald, bearded, mid-forties — appears in staged photo-ops with world-famous public figures including the heavyweight boxer Anthony Joshua, the British–Zimbabwean heavyweight Derek Chisora, the controversial internet personality Andrew Tate, and the celebrity restaurateur Nusret Gökçe ("Salt Bae"), at high-visibility Dubai venues including Amazónico Dubai and the Louis XIII cognac lounge. The reel's on-screen captions identify him as "Mahmoud Char", state that he is "44 years old", that he has been "scamming people in Marbella", that he is "now bouncing from palm villas to" the Dubai luxury circuit, that he "scammed millions through fake crypto projects", and that the entire celebrity-adjacent imagery is staged "to make it look legit". The naming, the geography, the age, the modus operandi and the celebrity-laundering pattern align precisely with the documented Fadi Khalil dossier — and the reel is preserved here as a primary-source social-media exhibit.
On 27 May 2026 the public Instagram reel located at https://www.instagram.com/reel/DWqwBJsDPPq/ was added to this investigation's archive. The reel — published from a third-party account and originally shared with this desk via WhatsApp — comprises a sequence of nine photographs and short clips, each overlaid with on-screen captions that, read in order, form a single narrative. The captions, in the order they appear in the reel, are: "44 years old," — "Now he's bouncing from palm villas to" — "Mahmoud Char, Andrew Tate, Anthony Joshua. Amazónico Dubai" with the tagged handles "@healthy_mindset @anthonyjoshua @derekwarchisora" — "a Palestinian Jew posing as a religious Muslim," — "After scamming people in Marbella," — (an unmarked Dubai-skyline frame) — "scammed millions through fake crypto projects" — "Mahmoud Char, Andrew Tate, Anthony Joshua" — "To make it look legit,". Each frame is preserved as an exhibit below in the order it appears in the reel.
Two of the on-screen tagged Instagram handles in the third frame — @anthonyjoshua and @derekwarchisora — are the verified public accounts of the heavyweight world champion Anthony Joshua OBE and the heavyweight contender Derek Chisora respectively. The third tagged handle, @healthy_mindset, appears in the reel as the account attributed to the bald, bearded subject of the photographs. The geo-location tag visible on the third frame reads "Amazónico Dubai" — the well-known luxury Latin-American restaurant in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The Louis XIII branding visible in the ninth frame is the high-end Rémy Martin cognac lounge interior, used as a status backdrop in luxury influencer content. The seventh frame shows the subject seated at a table being served by Nusret Gökçe ("Salt Bae"), the Turkish celebrity restaurateur whose Dubai Nusr-Et outlets are themselves a recognised vehicle for high-net-worth photo-op laundering.
The on-screen narrative in the reel — a 44-year-old operator with a Marbella history, a fake-crypto-projects history, a "palm villas" Dubai phase, and a documented practice of staging photo-ops with globally recognised public figures to manufacture legitimacy — is, on every individual element, a direct match to the documented Fadi Khalil pattern already established across this investigation: the Spanish coastal phase (the 2019 Puerto Banús arrest under a forged Central African Republic diplomatic passport, originally reported by Marbella24Horas), the multi-vehicle fake-crypto-projects history (Medacoin, Medabots / $MEDA on BSCPad, SHIA / Shiba Saga, Vacay Finance, Galaxy Explorer — the latter announced at the Cashaa Blockchain Summit & Awards 2023 in Dubai under the title "Founder & CEO, Galaxy Explorer"), the documented alias pattern (@MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga), and the systematic exploitation of credible third-party stages (Het Parool, Bright.nl, Peter R. de Vries television footage, Cashaa Blockchain Summit) as social proof in the next investor pitch. The "Mahmoud Char" identifier appearing in the reel is now under active verification by this desk as a potential additional alias in the same pattern; it is preserved here exactly as it appears in the source reel, without independent attribution.
Two important framing notes. First, none of the named public figures who appear in or alongside these photographs — Anthony Joshua, Derek Chisora, Andrew Tate, Nusret Gökçe / Salt Bae, the Amazónico Dubai venue, the Louis XIII lounge, or any other person visible in the frames — is alleged, on the basis of the public record reviewed by this investigation, to have had any knowledge of the subject's background, of any Marbella history, or of any of the documented vehicles in the Khalil dossier at the time the photographs were taken. The criticism, exactly as with the earlier Het Parool, Bright.nl, Peter R. de Vries and Cashaa Blockchain Summit archive entries, concerns the systematic exploitation of credible public figures as unwitting social-proof backdrops — not the conduct of those figures themselves. Second, the on-screen claim "a Palestinian Jew posing as a religious Muslim" is reproduced here verbatim because it appears in the source reel; it is presented as a quotation of the reel's caption, not as an endorsed factual finding of this investigation, and no inference about the subject's ethnicity or religion is drawn or implied by this desk beyond what the public reel itself states.
Why the Reel Matters as Evidence — and What to Do If You Recognise the Subject, the Venues or the Photo-Ops
Publicly published social-media content that names an alleged operator, states his age, names the geography of the alleged conduct, names the alleged modus operandi (crypto fraud) and visually documents the photo-op laundering mechanism in operation is a category of evidence that is rare and disproportionately valuable. It is rare because most operators in this pattern are visually elusive; it is valuable because it short-circuits the central defence — that the operator is "a businessman, look at the people he is photographed with". The reel preserved here flips that defence on its head: the celebrity proximity is itself the evidence of the laundering mechanism, not evidence of legitimacy. That is why the full sequence of nine frames is preserved with on-screen captions intact.
If you are an investigative journalist, compliance analyst, OSINT researcher, financial-intelligence-unit liaison, or law-enforcement officer working in fraud, AML, or financial-crime, and you have independently sourced material that corroborates, contradicts or extends any element of this reel — the "Mahmoud Char" identifier, the @healthy_mindset Instagram handle, the Amazónico Dubai or Louis XIII venue footage, the Salt Bae frame, the gala-dinner frame with Andrew Tate and Anthony Joshua, the palm-villas frame, or the chess-board frame referenced to Marbella — the investigation desk welcomes inbound contact through the Submit Evidence channel on this platform. All such contact is source-protective.
If you are a member of the public, a venue staff member at Amazónico Dubai, a Nusr-Et Dubai employee, a Louis XIII lounge attendant, or anyone else who has direct knowledge of when, where and under whose hospitality these photographs were arranged — please make contact. Times, dates, the names of any fixers, agents or hospitality intermediaries who organised the celebrity proximity, and any payment-trail information (table reservations, hospitality invoices, gift handovers) are all relevant. The objective, exactly as with the Cashaa Blockchain Summit entry, is to identify the recurring intermediaries who repeatedly stage these photo-ops for this operator — not the celebrities themselves.
If you are an associate, former associate, member of staff, security contractor, driver, household assistant, accountant or business contact of any of the named or tagged individuals — and you observed any conduct that suggests the subject of these photographs is the operator documented in this dossier under any of the identities Fadi Khalil, "Mahmoud Char", @healthy_mindset, @MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga, "Founder & CEO, Galaxy Explorer", or any further variant — confidential reporting is available through the Submit Evidence form. Every additional identifier hardens the dossier, and every additional verified alias closes one more route through which the operator can continue to introduce himself to a new audience under a new name.
Chainalysis is the de-facto global infrastructure that connects on-chain activity to real-world compliance: it powers Reactor (the investigations tool used by law enforcement and financial-intelligence units in more than 70 jurisdictions), KYT (the transaction-monitoring engine embedded inside the largest crypto exchanges, custodians and tier-1 banks), and the Crypto Investigations Specialist (CIS) and Chainalysis Investigations Solution programmes through which fraud-linked addresses are formally tagged, attributed and surfaced to compliance teams worldwide. Registering the consolidated Xpose / Apps Innovations BV / Medacoin / Medabots / $MEDA / SHIA / Vacay Finance / Galaxy Explorer address cluster — together with the underlying conviction, the trustee filings and the consolidated victim cohort — into the Chainalysis ecosystem is the single highest-leverage step still outstanding in this investigation.
Chainalysis Inc., headquartered in New York with offices in London, Washington D.C., Singapore, Tokyo and Copenhagen, is the largest blockchain-data and compliance company in the world. Its public website at https://www.chainalysis.com/ describes the three product surfaces that matter for this dossier: Chainalysis Reactor (the investigations graph used by government agencies, including the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation division, Europol, the U.K. National Crime Agency, the Dutch FIOD and Politie, the German BKA, and dozens of other law-enforcement and financial-intelligence units globally); Chainalysis KYT (Know-Your-Transaction — the real-time monitoring layer embedded inside Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, Bitstamp, Bitvavo, BTC Direct, Bitpanda, Bitfinex, Crypto.com, OKX, and the majority of tier-1 banks and payment institutions that now hold crypto exposure); and the Chainalysis Investigations Solution, which is the formal intake channel through which victim groups, journalists, law firms, trustees and regulators can submit case material for attribution, address-cluster analysis and tagging.
For the Khalil dossier, registration into the Chainalysis ecosystem is not a symbolic step — it is the operational mechanism through which every other piece of evidence already on the public record becomes actionable inside the global financial system. The December 2024 Amsterdam District Court conviction (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102, 36 months imprisonment with 6 months suspended, 5-year professional ban) is a Dutch judicial fact; once the conviction, the named legal entities (Apps Innovations BV, Marbella Talent Agency, Vacay Finance) and the documented operator aliases (@MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga, "Founder & CEO, Galaxy Explorer") are attached to the on-chain address clusters inside Chainalysis Reactor, that Dutch judicial fact propagates — automatically and continuously — to every compliance dashboard at every exchange, custodian and bank that runs KYT. An attempted deposit, swap, withdrawal or fiat off-ramp from any tagged address triggers a real-time alert at the receiving institution. That is what closes the on-chain loop.
The on-chain perimeter being submitted is, on the public record assembled by this investigation, unusually broad and unusually well-corroborated. It covers: (i) the Medacoin token contract and associated treasury, marketing, team and liquidity-provider wallets across the Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain networks; (ii) the Medabots / $MEDA public-sale contract on BSCPad and the addresses that received the public-sale proceeds; (iii) the SHIA / Shiba Saga deployer, treasury and promotion wallets associated with the documented "Mr Shiba Saga" alias; (iv) the Vacay Finance contract and operational wallets; (v) the Galaxy Explorer-associated receiving addresses surfaced through the Cashaa Blockchain Summit (Dubai, February 2023) promotional cycle; (vi) the consolidated victim-reported deposit addresses voluntarily submitted to this investigation through the Submit Evidence and Report Wallet Addresses forms; and (vii) the off-ramp addresses identified through the Yspeert Advocaten Voortgangsverslag 10 trustee report in the Apps Innovations BV bankruptcy, to the extent on-chain analysis correlates those flows with crypto-asset movements. The submission package will additionally include the full mainstream-press paper trail (Het Financieele Dagblad, Bright.nl, Het Parool, Cashaa News, the Marbella24Horas Puerto Banús arrest record), the Bijzonderstrafrecht.nl legal analysis, the ScamKnown public-registry listing and the consolidated victim-cohort statistics (112 registered individuals, 11 jurisdictions, €70.6M+ in claims) under appropriate anonymisation.
The mechanics of registration are well-documented on the Chainalysis platform itself. The Chainalysis Investigations Solution accepts submissions from law-enforcement agencies, regulators, financial-intelligence units, exchanges, victim groups, trustees in bankruptcy, law firms acting for victims, and accredited investigative journalists. Submissions are reviewed by the Chainalysis Investigations team, address clusters are attributed where the evidence supports attribution, and tags are then propagated through Reactor (for the investigations side) and through KYT category labels (for the compliance side). For convicted-fraud cases with a judicial fact pattern as clean as the December 2024 Amsterdam ruling, the typical category labels include "Fraud Shop", "Scam", "High-Risk Jurisdiction Off-Ramp" and, where applicable, "Sanctioned" — each of which carries automatic, pre-configured compliance behaviour at every KYT-integrated institution. In practice, that means: once the cluster is tagged, the operator's ability to move value through the regulated financial system collapses in near-real-time.
How the Submission Will Be Made — and How Authorities, Exchanges and Compliance Teams Can Accelerate It
The Xpose / Khalil submission package is being prepared for formal intake through the Chainalysis Investigations Solution channel published at https://www.chainalysis.com/. The package will be transmitted under the investigation desk's contact identity, accompanied by the consolidated dossier, the Amsterdam District Court ruling (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102), the Bijzonderstrafrecht.nl legal analysis, the Yspeert Advocaten Voortgangsverslag 10 trustee report covering the Apps Innovations BV bankruptcy, the Het Financieele Dagblad reporting, the consolidated on-chain address inventory across Medacoin, Medabots / $MEDA, SHIA / Shiba Saga, Vacay Finance and Galaxy Explorer, and the anonymised victim-cohort statistics. The objective of the submission is formal address-cluster attribution and tagging inside both Reactor and KYT, such that every Chainalysis-integrated institution worldwide receives the relevant alerts whenever a tagged address touches its perimeter.
Authorities and law-enforcement liaisons (Dutch FIOD, Politie, Openbaar Ministerie; Spanish Guardia Civil and Policía Nacional in the Marbella jurisdiction; UAE securities and financial-conduct authorities; U.S. FBI and IRS-CI for the cross-border crypto component; Europol's European Cybercrime Centre EC3): if your agency already operates a Chainalysis Reactor license, the investigation desk welcomes inbound coordination so that the submission can be made jointly under your case reference, which materially shortens the attribution timeline and aligns the tagging with any active criminal investigation file you are running. Joint submissions from a victim-side investigation desk and a law-enforcement licensee are the format Chainalysis routes fastest.
Exchanges, custodians, payment institutions and tier-1 banks running Chainalysis KYT: once the Khalil cluster is tagged, the relevant alerts will flow to your compliance dashboards automatically. In the interim — and this is the period in which the operator and any remaining associates have the greatest incentive to move residual value — the investigation desk can provide the consolidated address inventory directly to your AML and financial-crime compliance teams under appropriate confidentiality terms, so that internal watchlists can be updated ahead of the formal Chainalysis tagging. Inbound contact from compliance, AML, fraud, risk, sanctions or financial-intelligence officers at any KYT-integrated institution is welcomed through the Submit Evidence channel on this platform; all such contact is treated as source-protective.
Victims and whistleblowers: if you sent crypto to, received crypto from, or otherwise interacted on-chain with any wallet linked to Xpose, Apps Innovations BV, Medacoin, Medabots, $MEDA, BSCPad's Medabots sale, SHIA, Shiba Saga, Vacay Finance, Galaxy Explorer, or any of the documented operator aliases (@MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga), please submit the transaction hashes and the counterparty addresses through the Report Wallet Addresses form on this platform. Every additional address strengthens the cluster, sharpens the attribution and increases the probability that residual operator funds — including any value still sitting in off-ramp wallets, mixer outputs or bridge-deposit accounts — is identified, frozen and ultimately returned. The Chainalysis submission is the mechanism through which your individual report ceases to be one entry in a victim spreadsheet and becomes part of the global compliance perimeter watching for this operator.
The International Journal of Business Information Systems (IJBIS), published by Inderscience Publishers, is one of the peer-reviewed academic venues in which financial-crime, fraud-detection, anti-money-laundering and crypto-asset misconduct cases are formally documented, classified and analysed by researchers, regulators and compliance scholars. The Khalil dossier — with its rare combination of mainstream-press paper trail, criminal conviction, multiple alias identities, cross-border vehicles and on-chain evidence — is now exactly the kind of case material that lands in this academic pipeline. The journal's forthcoming-articles register is preserved here as the entry point.
The International Journal of Business Information Systems (IJBIS), published by Inderscience Publishers, maintains a public forthcoming-articles register at https://www.inderscience.com/info/ingeneral/forthcoming.php?jcode=ijbis. The page lists papers that have been accepted after peer review and are scheduled for publication in upcoming issues. IJBIS is one of a number of established peer-reviewed venues — alongside journals such as the Journal of Financial Crime, the Journal of Money Laundering Control, the International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, and Crime, Law and Social Change — in which academic researchers, financial-crime analysts, compliance scholars, regulatory liaisons and law-enforcement-affiliated authors formally publish case-study research, methodology papers and empirical analyses of fraud schemes, including crypto-asset fraud, securities fraud and cross-border investment fraud.
For the Khalil dossier, the academic pipeline matters for two specific reasons. First, peer-reviewed publication is the format in which serious financial-crime research is rendered citable — by other researchers, by regulators in formal policy papers, by courts in expert-witness contexts, and by compliance teams writing internal risk frameworks. A peer-reviewed academic case-study of the Xpose / Medacoin / Medabots / Shiba Saga / Vacay Finance / Galaxy Explorer vehicle pattern would not merely repeat the journalistic record — it would consolidate it under a methodology, a typology and a citation that future regulatory and judicial proceedings can reference. Second, IJBIS and similar journals attract submissions specifically from authors with regulator, central-bank, financial-intelligence-unit and law-enforcement affiliations, who use the academic format precisely because it allows formal disclosure of patterns and methodologies without the constraints of internal-classification regimes.
The Khalil case is, on the public record alone, a near-ideal academic case-study object. It combines: (i) a securities-fraud component prosecuted in a major European jurisdiction (the December 2024 Amsterdam District Court conviction, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102, 36 months imprisonment with 6 months suspended and a 5-year professional ban), (ii) a major financial-press paper trail (Het Financieele Dagblad, January 2025), (iii) a mainstream-press endorsement loop weaponised as social proof (Peter R. de Vries television footage, Bright.nl product review, Het Parool feature), (iv) a multi-vehicle structure across both fiat (Apps Innovations BV, Marbella Talent Agency, Vacay Finance) and crypto (Medacoin, Medabots / $MEDA on BSCPad, SHIA / Shiba Saga, Galaxy Explorer) lines, (v) a documented operational geography spanning the Netherlands, Spain, Malta, the UAE and Latin America, (vi) a recurring alias pattern (@MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga) that maps cleanly to the academic literature on identity fragmentation in serial fraud, and (vii) a consolidated victim base — 112 registered individuals across 11 jurisdictions, €70.6M+ in claims — large enough to support empirical methodology.
The investigation desk is therefore making the entire public dossier formally available, under open citation terms, to any peer-reviewed academic author working in fraud research, financial-crime typology, crypto-asset compliance, securities-regulation policy, victim-recovery methodology, or international AML coordination who wishes to use the Khalil case as case-study material in a forthcoming submission to IJBIS or to any equivalent journal. Inderscience's forthcoming-articles register is preserved as the canonical entry point because the publication of even a single peer-reviewed paper that treats this case as an empirical object of study materially changes the formal evidentiary status of the consolidated dossier in every downstream proceeding.
Why Academic Documentation Closes the Loop — and How to Contribute
A consolidated investigation file, however thorough, is a journalistic and litigation artifact. Court rulings, financial-press coverage, on-chain analysis and victim testimony are all weighed at the level of the individual jurisdiction and the individual proceeding. Peer-reviewed academic publication operates one layer above that: it crystallises the pattern itself — the typology of vehicles, the recruitment mechanics, the social-proof laundering, the cross-jurisdiction migration — into a citable analytic framework. Once the Khalil case appears in the academic literature as a worked example of a multi-vehicle cross-border investment-and-crypto-fraud typology, every future regulator drafting a warning notice, every future court evaluating a related civil claim, and every future compliance team writing a risk framework can cite the analysis directly. That is what academic documentation closes the loop on.
If you are an academic researcher, doctoral candidate, post-doctoral fellow, regulator-affiliated author, central-bank analyst, FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit) author, or law-enforcement-affiliated scholar working in fraud research, financial crime, AML, securities regulation, crypto-asset compliance, victimology, or behavioural finance — and you are considering a submission to IJBIS or to an equivalent peer-reviewed journal — the consolidated Khalil dossier is available to you under open citation terms. The investigation desk can provide structured datasets (anonymised where appropriate), timestamped primary documentation, on-chain analysis files, court-filing copies, press-coverage archives, and direct (consent-screened) victim testimonial material. All collaboration is documented and source-protective.
If you have already authored, co-authored, peer-reviewed or are aware of any forthcoming or in-press paper — at IJBIS, at any other Inderscience-published journal, or at any equivalent peer-reviewed venue — that touches on the Xpose, Apps Innovations BV, Medacoin, Medabots, $MEDA, SHIA / Shiba Saga, Vacay Finance, Galaxy Explorer or Marbella Talent Agency case-clusters, or on the operator under any of the documented identities or aliases, please make contact through the Submit Evidence form on this platform. Confidentiality of the peer-review process is fully respected; the investigation desk's only interest is in ensuring the academic record and the consolidated public file remain aligned.
For authorities, regulators and law-enforcement liaisons who themselves contribute, in their personal academic capacity, to journals such as IJBIS: the investigation desk welcomes any formal inbound query for structured data, methodology notes or anonymised victim cohort statistics that could be cited under appropriate disclosure terms. The objective on every side is the same — to convert what is currently an unusually well-documented individual case into a properly classified, peer-reviewed exemplar that protects future targets across every jurisdiction the underlying pattern reaches.
On 30 January 2023, the Cashaa Announcements Telegram channel (@cashaanews, 6.87K subscribers) formally announced Fadi Khalil as a featured speaker at the Cashaa Blockchain Summit & Awards (#CBS2023) on 4–5 February 2023 in Dubai — under the title "Founder & CEO, Galaxy Explorer". The announcement is preserved in the channel's archive and is yet another documented instance of the same playbook: a new corporate identity, a new high-profile crypto-conference stage, and a new audience to pitch.
On 30 January 2023, the verified Cashaa Announcements Telegram channel — @cashaanews, 6.87K subscribers, the official announcements feed of the Cashaa ecosystem — published a promotional post announcing the Cashaa Blockchain Summit & Awards ("#CBS2023"), scheduled for 4–5 February 2023 in Dubai and organised by Vertex Ventures. The post is preserved in the channel's archive and remains accessible via https://t.me/s/cashaanews?before=2319. Among the featured speakers prominently displayed on the official event creative was "MR. FADI KHALIL — Founder & CEO, Galaxy Explorer".
The same announcement also tagged Fadi Khalil in the meet-and-greet copy alongside Akash Gaurav (Founder of Rivera Money), Ankitt Gaur (Founder of @EasyfiNetwork), and Baiba Broka (former Minister of Justice), describing him as "Galaxy Explorer joining #CBS2023 in Dubai." The promotional image — now preserved in this investigation's archive — shows Khalil's portrait, the "SPEAKER" badge, the Cashaa branding and the Vertex Ventures organiser credit. The image is reproduced below in full, as captured from the original Telegram post.
"Galaxy Explorer" is, on the public record reviewed by this investigation, yet another corporate identity in the long-running pattern documented across the Khalil dossier. Following the alarm-app vehicle (Xpose / Apps Innovations BV — the subject of the December 2024 Amsterdam District Court conviction and the January 2025 Het Financieele Dagblad coverage), the Medacoin / Medabots / $MEDA token launch via BSCPad, the SHIA / Shiba Saga token promotion (operated under the documented alias "Mr Shiba Saga"), and the Vacay Finance vehicle, "Galaxy Explorer" appears as another new corporate identity rolled out in front of a new international audience — in this case, the institutional and retail attendees of a Dubai blockchain summit.
The pattern itself is the story. Each vehicle is presented under a new name (Apps Innovations, Medacoin, Medabots, Shiba Saga, Vacay Finance, Galaxy Explorer); each new identity is laundered through legitimate-looking infrastructure (Dutch mainstream press for Xpose, the BSCPad public-sale platform for Medabots, an organised Dubai conference for Galaxy Explorer); each appearance is then weaponised as social proof in the next investor pitch ("as featured at Cashaa Blockchain Summit 2023, Dubai, alongside a former Minister of Justice"). Cashaa, Vertex Ventures, the fellow announced speakers and the other organisations associated with the event are not — on the basis of the public record reviewed — alleged to have been aware of the broader pattern at the time. The criticism, as with the earlier Het Parool and Bright.nl and Peter R. de Vries archive entries, concerns the systematic exploitation of credible public stages, not the conduct of the stages themselves.
Why the Galaxy Explorer / CBS2023 Archive Matters — and What to Do If You Met Him There
The Cashaa Blockchain Summit & Awards 2023 in Dubai was a sizeable international event with a regulated-financial-institution adjacent audience: exchange operators, token issuers, payment-platform executives, regulatory-policy figures, conference-investing retail attendees, and crypto-media. Anyone introduced to Fadi Khalil at #CBS2023 under the "Founder & CEO, Galaxy Explorer" framing — whether at the main stage, the speakers' lounge, the meet-and-greet sessions referenced in the Cashaa announcement, or in any side conversation — was, at that moment, being introduced under a corporate identity that, on the evidence currently consolidated in this investigation, fits the same pattern documented across every previous Khalil vehicle.
If you attended CBS2023 in Dubai and met Fadi Khalil — or were pitched, after the event, by anyone presenting themselves as connected to "Galaxy Explorer" — the investigation desk would like to hear from you. Even a contact card, a follow-up WhatsApp introduction, a draft term sheet, a deck shown over coffee at the venue, or a memory of which other delegates he was introduced to is materially useful. The Dubai-conference circuit has been one of the principal recruitment channels used to onboard high-net-worth Gulf-resident counterparties into the Khalil orbit, and direct first-hand accounts from delegates are precisely the kind of evidence that fills the geographic gaps in the consolidated dossier.
If you are or were involved in the organisation, sponsorship, partner-vetting, programme committee, speaker-curation or due-diligence side of CBS2023 — or of any similar Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Malta, Lisbon or Marbella conference at which Galaxy Explorer, Medacoin / Medabots / $MEDA, SHIA / Shiba Saga, Vacay Finance, Xpose, or Apps Innovations BV were represented — the investigation desk welcomes a confidential briefing. The historical onboarding paperwork, sponsorship correspondence, speaker NDAs and post-event communications are, in the consolidated international legal context, evidentially significant and will be handled under strict source protection.
For prospective new counterparties — banks, exchanges, payment processors, KYC providers, conference organisers — performing due diligence on the name "Galaxy Explorer" or on any individual using it: the consolidated investigation file on this platform, the independent ScamKnown registry listing ("fadi-khalil-crypto-fraud-dubai"), the Cashaa News alert circulation already documented in the news archive, and the December 2024 Amsterdam District Court criminal conviction (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102) collectively form a multi-source, multi-jurisdiction risk picture. Formal inbound queries from regulated entities are welcomed and will be answered within a defined disclosure framework.
Cashaa News, a verified Telegram channel used by authorities, financial-crime investigators and exchange compliance teams to publish and circulate crypto-fraud alerts, has now featured material connected to the Fadi Khalil fraud investigation. The post — preserved at t.me/cashaanews/2298 — is part of the growing international reporting infrastructure that takes cases like this one out of the realm of "isolated victim complaints" and into the formal cross-border alert pipeline.
Cashaa News, the public Telegram channel operated in association with the Cashaa financial-crime intelligence and compliance ecosystem, has now published material linked to the Fadi Khalil fraud investigation. The post is preserved at https://t.me/cashaanews/2298?single and is now archived as part of the investigation's open-source international-alerts dossier. Cashaa News functions as one of the live circulation channels through which authorities, compliance officers at regulated crypto exchanges, blockchain-forensics firms, and international financial-crime journalists submit and propagate alerts about high-risk operators, tokens and projects.
For readers unfamiliar with the channel: Cashaa News is not a tabloid feed and not an opinion outlet. It operates as a structured reporting and alerting infrastructure — similar in function to the public-facing layer of organisations such as Chainabuse, ScamSniffer and the Crystal Blockchain alert network. The audience is operational: AML (Anti-Money-Laundering) teams at banks and exchanges, regulator liaisons in multiple jurisdictions, KYC providers, fraud-recovery specialists, on-chain analysts, and the international financial-crime press. When material connected to a named operator appears in that pipeline, it is read by exactly the people whose decisions determine whether that operator continues to have access to banking rails, exchange listings, payment processing and platform onboarding.
The appearance of Khalil-related material in the Cashaa News channel matters for one specific reason: it changes the operational reach of the investigation. The consolidated dossier on this platform is — by design — comprehensive, primary-source-heavy and detailed. That depth is essential for litigation and for serious due diligence. But it is also, in operational terms, slow to read. A single, well-sourced alert circulating through Cashaa News reaches an audience of compliance and enforcement professionals in minutes, in a format they are trained to act on immediately. The two layers complement each other: the public dossier is the evidence base; the Telegram alert is the propagation mechanism.
For authorities, exchange compliance teams, banks, and regulated counterparties who arrive at this article through the Cashaa News channel: the full public investigation file is maintained on this platform. The Investigation, Rapsheet and Medacoin Heist sections contain the primary documentation — including the December 2024 Amsterdam District Court conviction (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102), the January 2025 Het Financieele Dagblad coverage, the BSCPad / Medium launch records for the Medabots / $MEDA token, the open-source identity triangulation across the documented aliases (@MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga), and the consolidated victim register currently standing at 112 individuals across eleven jurisdictions. Formal inbound queries from regulated entities are welcomed and will be responded to within a defined disclosure framework.
Why Authority-Facing Reporting Channels Matter — and How to Use This One
Modern cross-border financial fraud — particularly fraud with a crypto and a multi-jurisdiction component — does not collapse because a single court rules against the operator in a single country. It collapses because the operator's access to the global financial system is progressively withdrawn: banks decline onboarding, exchanges flag deposits, payment processors freeze transfers, KYC providers escalate the file, and counterparties walk away. That progressive withdrawal happens because authority-facing reporting channels — Cashaa News among them — circulate the underlying alerts to exactly the operational teams who make those decisions. Each new well-sourced alert in the pipeline measurably narrows the operator's runway.
If you are a victim of any Khalil-linked venture — Xpose, Apps Innovations BV, Medacoin, Medabots, $MEDA, SHIA / Shiba Saga, Vacay Finance, Marbella Talent Agency, or related vehicles — and you are pursuing a chargeback, an exchange dispute, a regulator complaint, or an AML escalation through your bank, you can now cite three reinforcing reference points: the public investigation file on this platform, the independent fraud-registry listing on ScamKnown ("fadi-khalil-crypto-fraud-dubai"), and the operational alert circulating through Cashaa News (t.me/cashaanews/2298). Together they establish exactly the multi-source, multi-jurisdiction, multi-type evidence pattern that compliance and enforcement teams are trained to act on.
If you are a compliance officer, AML investigator, exchange trust & safety contact, banking onboarding analyst, KYC provider, or regulator-liaison professional and you have arrived at this article through the Cashaa News alert: the investigation desk welcomes formal inbound queries. Structured evidence packages — including timestamped victim accounts (with source-protection guarantees), on-chain analysis, court filings, and corroborating press coverage — can be released under defined disclosure terms to verified regulated counterparties for use in specific risk assessments, transaction monitoring, sanctions screening adjacent processes, and onboarding decisions.
If you operate, contribute to, or moderate another authority-facing fraud-alert channel — whether on Telegram, X, Signal, dedicated industry forums, or compliance-only distribution lists — and you wish to circulate or cross-reference the Khalil dossier within your audience, please make contact through the Submit Evidence form on this platform. Cross-channel propagation of well-sourced alerts is exactly the mechanism by which the operational runway of a cross-border fraud operator is, in practice, closed.
Alongside the Peter R. de Vries television endorsement and the Bright.nl product review, Het Parool — Amsterdam's flagship daily newspaper — also published a prominent feature on the Xpose safety app under the headline "Veiligheidsapp Xpose filmt alle engerds bij paniek" ("Safety app Xpose films all creeps in a panic"). The article appeared at the height of Xpose's investor recruitment phase and is preserved here as part of the archive of mainstream Dutch press coverage that gave the project the public credibility it needed to extract millions from retail investors.
On its original publication, Het Parool — the leading daily newspaper of Amsterdam and one of the most-read regional titles in the Netherlands — ran a prominent feature on the Xpose app under the headline "Veiligheidsapp Xpose filmt alle engerds bij paniek" ("Safety app Xpose films all creeps in a panic"). The article framed Xpose as a genuine personal-safety product: an app that, at the press of a panic button, would automatically begin filming the surroundings of the user, with the resulting footage immediately uploaded and secured for use as evidence in a subsequent police complaint. The piece is preserved at https://www.parool.nl/nieuws/veiligheidsapp-xpose-filmt-alle-engerds-bij-paniek~b116d641/ and is now archived within the investigation's open-source press dossier.
The significance of the Parool feature mirrors — and reinforces — the significance of the Peter R. de Vries television endorsement and the Bright.nl product review already documented on this platform. None of these outlets are tabloids. None of them are crypto-promotional newsletters. They are mainstream Dutch news organisations with national readership and editorial reputations built over decades. When a Dutch retail investor, in 2018–2021, performed even the most basic due diligence on the Xpose project — typing the name into Google, looking for press coverage — these are the publications that came back. The combined effect of seeing a De Vries television clip, a Bright.nl product review, and a Het Parool news feature was, for most investors, decisive. Three independent mainstream outlets had covered the product positively; how could it not be real?
It was not. The app was never delivered in functional form. The panic-button live-streaming feature highlighted in the Parool article — the exact feature that gave the product its emotional appeal — never reached a working version that could be used in the way the press coverage described. Investor funds raised on the strength of this and similar coverage were diverted, and the operator relocated to Spain to live the luxurious lifestyle later documented by Het Financieele Dagblad on 3 January 2025. The Public Prosecutor demanded prison sentences. The Amsterdam District Court convicted (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102). And the Parool article — written in good faith at the time, on the basis of the same misrepresentations made to investors — became, in retrospect, one of the most consequential pieces of public credibility ever extended to the operator.
Het Parool is not in any way criticised here. The newspaper covered a product pitch presented to it in the same form, and with the same supporting material, that was presented to private investors. The criticism — extensively documented after the collapse by GeenStijl and others — concerns the systematic exploitation of mainstream Dutch press coverage as a sales tool, not the conduct of any journalist or any editorial desk. Preserving this Parool feature in the investigation archive serves exactly one purpose: to make the mechanism of the fraud legible, so that the next equivalent pitch — to the next equivalent newsroom — is recognised for what it is before the same cycle repeats.
How the Parool Endorsement Was Used — and Why the Archive Matters
The Het Parool article was not simply a one-off press hit. Like the Peter R. de Vries television segment and the Bright.nl product review, it was extracted, screenshotted, embedded in investor decks, linked in WhatsApp pitches, cited in private fundraising calls, and reused for years on social media and on the project's own promotional channels. The "as featured in Het Parool" framing — accompanied by the newspaper's distinctive masthead — was specifically used to convert hesitant retail investors. Multiple victim accounts on file with the investigation team explicitly cite the Parool coverage as one of the two or three decisive factors in their decision to transfer funds.
The Parool feature also illustrates how easily a sympathetic product story can be turned into investor-grade social proof. The newspaper covered Xpose in the same register it routinely uses for innovative local tech initiatives — a product description, a quote from the founder, a friendly framing. None of that framing implied an investment recommendation; none of it was intended as financial endorsement. But once published, the article was operationally indistinguishable, in the eyes of a retail investor, from third-party validation of the underlying business case. That gap — between the editorial intent of the publication and the investor-facing weaponisation of the article — is exactly where the mechanism of this fraud lives.
For new readers arriving at this investigation through Het Parool's archive: the consolidated public dossier on this platform documents what happened to the Xpose project after the press coverage period — the non-delivery of the product, the diversion of investor funds, the relocation to Spain, the Dutch Public Prosecutor's demand for prison sentences, and the December 2024 criminal conviction at the Amsterdam District Court for investment fraud (36 months imprisonment, 6 months suspended, 5-year professional ban). The full evidence base is available through the Investigation, Rapsheet and Medacoin Heist sections of this site.
If you invested in Xpose, Apps Innovations BV, or any successor or related vehicle after seeing the Het Parool feature — or after being shown a screenshot, link, or "as featured in Het Parool" badge derived from it — you are encouraged to submit your account through the confidential Submit Evidence form on this platform. The press-driven recruitment pathway is one of the most clearly documented strands of the consolidated mega-action, and each additional verified account directly strengthens the legal team's ability to pursue restitution and accountability.
An independent international crypto-fraud registry, ScamKnown, has published a dedicated public profile for Fadi Khalil under the identifier "fadi-khalil-crypto-fraud-dubai". The listing — accessible to anyone in the world without registration — confirms what holders of Medacoin, Medabots, $MEDA and the SHIA / Shiba Saga tokens have been saying for years: the projects associated with Khalil are formally categorised as crypto-fraud in an independent third-party watchdog database.
The international crypto-fraud watchdog platform ScamKnown has now published a dedicated public profile page for Fadi Khalil, accessible at https://scamknown.com/profile.html?id=fadi-khalil-crypto-fraud-dubai. ScamKnown is one of a growing set of independent, community-driven fraud registries used by retail crypto investors, exchange compliance teams, on-chain forensics firms and journalists to check the reputational footprint of token issuers, project founders and promoters before committing capital. A formal listing on such a platform, under a dedicated profile slug, is significant — it means the operator has been independently assessed and flagged by an entity that does not answer to him, his lawyers, or his promotional channels.
The profile slug itself — "fadi-khalil-crypto-fraud-dubai" — is, on its own, evidentially noteworthy. Three of the most contested factual claims made on this investigation platform are encoded directly into the URL chosen by an independent third party: the individual's identity (Fadi Khalil), the categorisation of the conduct (crypto-fraud), and the operational geography (Dubai). For an independent watchdog to choose exactly that taxonomy for the dedicated profile slug is, in practical terms, a third-party endorsement of the framing that this investigation has used from day one — without any coordination between the two platforms.
The ScamKnown listing complements, rather than duplicates, the existing primary-source evidence already on this platform. The Dutch criminal conviction at the Amsterdam District Court (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102), the major Het Financieele Dagblad coverage of January 2025, the Peter R. de Vries archive footage, the BSCPad public sale records for the Medabots / $MEDA token launch, the GeenStijl reporting trail, and the on-chain analysis of the Medacoin liquidity behaviour — all of which already sit in the public investigation file — are now joined by a formal independent-watchdog classification that any prospective new counterparty, exchange or platform can verify in seconds by typing the operator's name into a public crypto-fraud registry.
For victims, the practical importance of the ScamKnown entry is straightforward: it dramatically lowers the burden of proof required to convince a hesitant exchange, payment processor, banking partner or platform compliance officer that the counterparty is materially elevated risk. Where the consolidated dossier on this platform requires the reader to engage with court rulings, financial-press reporting and on-chain evidence, the ScamKnown profile delivers the same conclusion in a single linkable URL hosted by an entity entirely independent of this investigation.
Why an Independent Registry Listing Matters — and How to Use It
An independent fraud-registry entry materially changes the practical legal and operational position of every victim. When a registered victim files a chargeback request with their bank, a complaint with a payment processor, a know-your-customer dispute with an exchange, or a formal report to a national financial regulator, the existence of an independent third-party crypto-fraud listing — separate from this investigation and separate from any individual victim's account — adds a layer of corroboration that compliance teams are trained to weigh heavily. It transforms a "one disgruntled investor" framing into a "documented multi-source pattern" framing in a single citation.
If you are a current or former holder of Medacoin / Medabots / $MEDA, SHIA / Shiba Saga, Xpose-related tokens, or any other crypto product promoted by Fadi Khalil or by any of his documented aliases (@MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga), and you are pursuing a chargeback, a regulator complaint, an exchange dispute or an insurance claim — cite both the ScamKnown profile and the consolidated public investigation file maintained on this platform. Together, the two sources establish independence (a third party reached the same classification) and depth (a detailed primary-evidence file backs that classification up).
If you are an exchange compliance officer, payment-platform risk officer, banking AML team, or platform trust & safety contact and have arrived at this article through routine due diligence on a counterparty: the ScamKnown profile, the Dutch criminal court ruling, and the consolidated public investigation file are designed to be used in exactly the way you are using them now. The investigation desk welcomes formal inbound queries from regulated entities and will respond, within a defined disclosure framework, to requests for additional structured evidence relevant to specific risk assessments.
For new contributors to the investigation: if you encounter additional independent listings of Fadi Khalil, any documented alias, or any of the associated tokens, projects or vehicles on other fraud registries, watchdog databases, scam-tracking sites or regulator warning lists, please submit the URL through the confidential submission form on this platform. The investigation team continually consolidates these independent listings into the public open-source intelligence layer of the dossier, alongside court filings, financial-press coverage and direct victim testimony.
Long before the formal investigations, before the Dutch press coverage, and before the consolidated mega-lawsuit, one place was already keeping a real-time public record of what was happening to Medacoin holders: the #Medacoin hashtag on X (formerly Twitter). The search-indexed thread — preserved and continually growing — is one of the most important open-source evidence trails in the entire Khalil dossier.
The X (Twitter) hashtag #Medacoin is, today, a living archive. A single search at https://x.com/search?q=%23Medacoin returns hundreds of independent posts — from holders who bought into the token at launch, from on-chain analysts who watched the liquidity drain, from former community moderators who walked away once the pattern became clear, and from the broader crypto-investigation community that has since flagged Medacoin as a textbook example of a promoted-then-abandoned token launch. The thread spans years. It captures, in chronological order, the entire arc of the project — from the launch marketing through the price collapse to the present-day calls for accountability.
For the investigation team, the #Medacoin hashtag is significant for one specific reason: it pre-dates everything else. The earliest victim complaints, the earliest screenshots of broken promises, the earliest community calls for an audit — all of it was already public on X long before any Dutch newspaper, any regulator, or any legal coordination body had touched the file. That timestamped, publicly searchable record is exactly the kind of evidence that civil litigators in international cases rely on to establish what was knowable, by whom, and when. It removes any defence built on "we did not know" or "no-one complained at the time." People complained. Publicly. On the world's most widely indexed real-time platform. The record is right there.
The hashtag also functions as a discovery channel for victims who do not yet know that an organised investigation exists. Many holders who lost money on Medacoin tweeted once, in frustration, and never followed up — never realising that other holders were doing exactly the same thing in parallel, and never realising that those scattered individual posts could be consolidated into a single, jurisdictionally serious legal action. One of the practical goals of preserving and citing the #Medacoin thread on this platform is precisely that: to act as a bridge between the isolated individual post on X and the consolidated dossier on this site, so that every disillusioned holder eventually finds their way into the wider case.
Beyond the individual posts, the #Medacoin hashtag also captures the wider ecosystem reaction — independent crypto journalists, scam-tracking accounts, on-chain forensics analysts, and exchange community managers — all of whom flagged anomalies in the Medacoin / Medabots / $MEDA token launch, the BSCPad public sale, and the subsequent liquidity behaviour. Those external observations, made publicly and contemporaneously, are not opinion. They are timestamped expert commentary on a public blockchain event, and they form part of the same open-source evidentiary layer that this investigation now consolidates with the direct victim testimony already on file.
How to Use the #Medacoin Archive — and How to Add to It
If you are a Medacoin / Medabots / $MEDA holder, the first thing the investigation team recommends is to take a moment to search the #Medacoin hashtag yourself. You will almost certainly find posts from other holders describing the exact same experience you had. Take screenshots of any post that mirrors your own situation, save the post URL, and include them in your submission through the Submit Evidence form on this platform. Independent corroboration of the same pattern, from accounts with no connection to each other, is one of the strongest evidentiary signals a legal team can present.
If you originally posted on X about Medacoin and have since deleted your post, that is recoverable. The Wayback Machine (web.archive.org), the Google cache, and several specialised X-archive services routinely preserve hashtag-indexed posts even after deletion. The investigation desk can assist with the recovery process if you authorise it — just submit the original date, your handle at the time, and a description of what you posted, and the team will trace it through the relevant archives.
If you have never posted on X about Medacoin but you do hold (or held) the token: a single public post, with the #Medacoin hashtag and a short factual description of your experience, is one of the highest-leverage actions any individual holder can take. Each new post strengthens the public record, surfaces in future searches by other victims, and pressures the operators and the venues that promoted the launch to account for what happened. Coordinated, factual public posting is one of the most powerful tools available to a dispersed victim base.
For journalists, regulators, and investigators reviewing the Khalil dossier internationally: the #Medacoin hashtag is a recommended first-stop open-source reference, alongside the BSCPad sale records and the Medium launch materials already cited in the Medacoin Heist section of this platform. Read in combination, the three sources establish the full lifecycle of the token from promotion through to public collapse, in language and timestamps that no party to the dispute controls.
Public business-intelligence records corroborate what victims have been telling this investigation for months: Fadi Khalil does not operate under one name. He operates under a rotating set of online and project-specific aliases — among them @MrBigDswing, "Mr Chaptem" and "Mr Shiba Saga" — while the number of identified victims continues to climb across multiple jurisdictions. Independent reporting also indicates that Khalil is currently subject to a travel ban in the United Arab Emirates.
One of the most consistent patterns documented across the Fadi Khalil dossier is the deliberate fragmentation of his public identity. Victims, investors, ex-partners and former associates repeatedly describe being introduced to — or pitched by — the same individual under different names, depending on the venture, the platform and the audience. The investigation team has now consolidated the most frequently reported aliases: @MrBigDswing (used predominantly on social-media and crypto-promotional channels), "Mr Chaptem" (used in connection with earlier app and investment-fund pitches), and "Mr Shiba Saga" (used during the Shiba Saga / SHIA token promotion period). All three names trace back, through independent victim testimony and corroborating documentation, to the same individual: Fadi Khalil.
Independent business-intelligence aggregators corroborate the existence and reach of this professional footprint. A public profile on the contact-data platform RocketReach lists Fadi Khalil with associated professional and contact records — one of several open-source data points that allow victims and investigators to triangulate identity across jurisdictions and ventures. The profile is publicly accessible at https://rocketreach.co/fadi-khalil-email_24182806 and is preserved in the investigation's archive as part of the open-source identity dossier.
In parallel, multiple independent sources — including former business associates inside the Gulf and victims who attempted to pursue civil remedies locally — have informed this investigation that Fadi Khalil is currently subject to a travel ban in the United Arab Emirates. Travel bans in the UAE are typically imposed in connection with unresolved financial disputes, pending criminal complaints, or open civil judgments, and are recorded against the individual's passport at the border-control system level. The investigation team is in the process of formally confirming the legal basis and case reference of the UAE measure; this article will be updated with the verified details as soon as they are obtained through the appropriate channels.
The number of identified victims continues to climb. The consolidated registered count now exceeds 112 individuals across eleven jurisdictions, with combined documented claims of more than €70.6 million — and the inbound submission rate has accelerated meaningfully since the publication of the major Dutch financial-press coverage in January 2025 and the subsequent international reporting. The pattern across testimonies is strikingly consistent: an initial introduction under one name, a pitch built on social proof and celebrity association, a transfer of funds, and then the slow realisation — often only after months — that the person they trusted has appeared elsewhere, under a different name, running a structurally identical pitch on a new audience.
Why the Aliases Matter — and What to Do If You Recognise One
The operational use of multiple names is not incidental — it is a defensive technique. Each alias creates a fresh, search-clean identity for a new fundraising round, while insulating the new pitch from negative reporting attached to previous names. Victims of an earlier venture who later encounter "Mr Shiba Saga" or "@MrBigDswing" online frequently do not realise they are dealing with the same individual until significant funds have already been committed. Documenting and publishing the alias map is therefore one of the most direct protective actions this investigation can take for future targets.
If you ever transferred funds, signed paperwork, attended a private event, or received a pitch from any of the following identities — Fadi Khalil, @MrBigDswing, Mr Chaptem, Mr Shiba Saga, or any variant spelling — you are encouraged to submit a confidential account through the Submit Evidence form on this platform. Even a partial recollection — a date, a venue, a screenshot of a DM, a contract draft, a transfer confirmation — materially strengthens the consolidated dossier. Multiple independent reports referencing different aliases but describing the same conduct are some of the most decisive evidence the legal team can present in court.
Anyone with first-hand information about the UAE travel-ban proceedings — including former counterparties in the Gulf, ex-business partners, hospitality and concierge staff who witnessed border or check-in events, or any individual who has filed or considered filing a formal complaint in Dubai or Abu Dhabi — is specifically invited to come forward through the same confidential channel. Source protection is absolute; nothing is published without explicit written authorisation; and where requested, accounts are forwarded directly to the coordinating international legal team for inclusion in the consolidated mega-action without ever appearing on the public site.
Open-source records — including the RocketReach profile linked above — are preserved as part of the public investigation archive precisely so that future victims, journalists, regulators and law-enforcement contacts can independently verify the identity link between Fadi Khalil and the aliases under which he operates. The investigation does not republish private personal data from such aggregators; it cites the existence of the public record as one corroborating data point alongside the much more substantive evidence collected directly from victims.
On the morning of 1 January 2026, the investigation desk opened the inbox to a confirmed wire transfer of €100,000 from a single anonymous benefactor. It is, by an order of magnitude, the largest contribution this platform has ever received. Every euro will go into one thing only: a full ground-up rebuild of the public investigation website. On behalf of the entire team — and on behalf of the 112 registered victims this work serves — thank you.
It is rare, in independent investigative work, to begin a new year with anything other than the same fight that ended the old one. On the morning of 1 January 2026, the coordination desk of the Fadi Khalil Fraud Investigation opened a routine inbox check and found a single banking notification that immediately interrupted the routine: a confirmed, cleared incoming wire transfer of €100,000, sent on New Year's Eve, originating from an anonymous private benefactor who has explicitly requested that no identifying details be published. The donation is unrestricted, with one clearly stated wish from the donor — that it be used "to make the investigation visible to as many victims as possible."
For context: this single contribution is, by an order of magnitude, the largest the platform has ever received. The investigation has, until now, been carried by a coordinated effort of volunteer journalists, pro-bono legal coordination, victim contributions in the range of €10 to €500, and modest support from a small number of supporting professionals. €100,000 is, in real terms, the difference between continuing to patch a fast-growing site together in evenings and weekends, and building a proper international-grade investigative platform that can carry the case from where it now stands — 112 registered victims, eleven jurisdictions, €70.6 million in combined claims — all the way through to the hearings scheduled for August 2027 and beyond.
Every single euro of the €100,000 will go to one thing, and one thing only: a complete, ground-up rebuild of this website. Not a redesign. Not a refresh. A rebuild — with the architecture, the security, the multilingual reach, and the evidence-handling infrastructure that an international fraud investigation of this scale actually requires. The current site has done its job: it brought victims together, it consolidated public reporting, it survived a domain migration, and it ranked at the top of Google for the relevant searches within months of launch. But the next phase of this case is going to need more — and thanks to this donation, the next phase is going to get more.
To the anonymous donor: we cannot name you, but we can promise you this. Your money will not sit in an account, it will not be diverted to overheads, and it will not be spent on anything cosmetic. Every line item of the rebuild will be documented internally and made available for inspection by the coordinating legal team and by any registered victim who requests it. The first audited progress update will be published on this platform within sixty days. Thank you — from every member of this team, from every volunteer, and from every one of the 112 registered victims whose case file just got materially stronger because of what you did at the end of last year.
What the New Platform Will Do — and Why It Matters for Victims
Investigative case management at scale. The new platform will introduce a secure, end-to-end-encrypted case-file system that lets each registered victim see the status of their own contribution to the consolidated dossier, track the corroboration of their account against other independent reports, and communicate confidentially with the coordinating legal team. Today this is handled by hand, through email and spreadsheets. By the end of the rebuild it will be handled the way modern international civil actions are handled — with proper version control, proper audit trails, and proper source protection.
Full multilingual reach. The case spans, at minimum, Dutch, English, Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Arabic-speaking victim communities. The current site is English-only. The new platform will publish the full investigation in all eight languages — not via auto-translation widgets, but as professionally translated parallel editions — so that a victim in Marbella, Milan, Dubai or São Paulo can read the same evidence base, in their own language, that a victim in Amsterdam reads today.
Encrypted submissions at industry standard. The current Submit Evidence channel works and is safe, but the rebuild will move all incoming material onto a dedicated, hardened intake pipeline modelled on the standards used by major international investigative consortia. Anonymous submissions, encrypted attachments, dead-drop options, journalist source protection — all of it built in from day one rather than retrofitted.
A public, verifiable evidence archive. Court rulings, press records, corporate registry entries, banking trails, on-chain analysis — currently scattered across pages — will live in a single searchable, timestamped, citation-ready archive. Every claim made on the new site will be linked to its primary source in a way that journalists, lawyers and regulators in any jurisdiction can independently verify in seconds.
Resilient infrastructure. After the recent domain migration, it became clear that the platform needed to be hosted on infrastructure designed to absorb sudden traffic surges, withstand attempted takedown pressure, and stay online during sensitive publication windows. Part of the donation will go directly into hardened, redundant hosting and into an independent off-site mirror of the full evidence archive.
Alongside the financial-fraud dossier, this investigation has been receiving a rising number of reports from women describing sexual assault allegedly committed by, or in environments directly controlled by, Fadi Khalil. We are formally opening a confidential reporting line for these accounts. You are not alone, you will be believed, and your report will be handled with the highest possible standard of discretion and source protection.
In the past months a recurring, and deeply serious, category of report has been reaching the investigation team: women — across multiple countries — describing alleged sexual assaults, coercion and abuse linked to Fadi Khalil and to the closed luxury circuit (Marbella villas, Dubai hotel suites, after-parties, private events, "talent agency" introductions) that he and his network have used as social cover for years. These accounts are not isolated. They are arriving from independent sources, in different languages, with consistent patterns of grooming, isolation and abuse of power.
Until now, this strand has been handled internally — exclusively to protect victims. Today we are publicly opening a dedicated, confidential reporting channel for any woman (or person of any gender) who has experienced sexual assault, sexual coercion, drink-spiking, non-consensual recording, or any other form of sexual misconduct connected to Fadi Khalil, members of his entourage, or events organised under his ventures (including but not limited to Marbella Talent Agency, Xpose, Medacoin/Medabots, Vacay Finance, and related social events in Amsterdam, Marbella, Malta and Dubai).
You can come forward fully anonymously. You do not need to have documentation. You do not need to have made a police report. You do not need to have a "perfect" account. Even partial information — a date, a venue, a first name, a description, a screenshot — can be decisive when combined with the other testimony already on file. Patterns become provable only when multiple independent voices are placed side by side. That is exactly what this platform exists to do.
How your report is handled
Reports submitted via the Submit Evidence page on this platform are encrypted in transit, stored in a restricted file controlled only by the investigation coordination desk, and reviewed by trained personnel. Material related to alleged sexual offences is handled under the strictest source-protection regime we operate. It is never published on this website without your explicit written permission, never shared with media, and never used in any way that could identify you.
Where you authorise us to do so, your account — anonymised or named — is consolidated with corroborating reports and provided directly to the appropriate authorities: Dutch police and Openbaar Ministerie, the Spanish Policía Nacional (in particular Marbella jurisdiction), UAE authorities where applicable, and the relevant women's rights and victim-support NGOs that we coordinate with. We never contact you out of the blue, we never ask you for money, and any follow-up takes place exclusively by email, at the address you choose to share with us.
If you prefer not to engage with us at all and would rather go directly to professional support, that is also entirely valid. Below is a translated international list of confidential 24/7 support and emergency lines for survivors of sexual violence. All services are free of charge, the vast majority guarantee anonymity, and none of them require you to file a police report in order to talk to them. Where the original line operates in the local language, an English-speaking option or interpreter service is noted where available.
EUROPE — Netherlands: Centrum Seksueel Geweld 0800-0188 (24/7, free, anonymous, English support available). Belgium: Zorgcentra na Seksueel Geweld via 1712 (Dutch/French; English on request). United Kingdom: Rape Crisis England & Wales 0808 500 2222 (24/7) · Rape Crisis Scotland 08088 01 03 02 · Nexus NI (Northern Ireland) 0808 802 1414. Ireland: Dublin Rape Crisis Centre 1800 778 888 (24/7). Germany: Hilfetelefon "Gewalt gegen Frauen" 116 016 (24/7, free, 18 languages including English). France: Viols Femmes Informations 0 800 05 95 95 (free; English interpreter on request) — emergency 17 / 112. Spain: 016 (24/7, free, confidential, 53 languages including English; does not appear on phone bills) — emergency 091 / 112. Italy: Anti-violence helpline 1522 (24/7, free, English and several other languages). Portugal: APAV victim support 116 006. Switzerland: Opferhilfe Schweiz 143 / regional cantonal lines. Austria: Frauenhelpline 0800 222 555 (24/7, free, multilingual). Sweden: Kvinnofridslinjen 020-50 50 50 (24/7, free, English available). Norway: DIXI Ressurssenter 22 44 40 50 / national emergency 116 006. Denmark: Center for Voldtægtsofre / Lev Uden Vold 1888. Finland: Nollalinja 080 005 005. Poland: Niebieska Linia 800 120 002. Greece: SOS line 15900.
NORTH AMERICA — United States: RAINN National Sexual Assault Hotline 1-800-656-HOPE (4673), 24/7, free, confidential, English & Spanish; online chat at online.rainn.org. Canada: Provincial sexual-assault centres (Ontario 1-866-863-0511 · Québec 1 888 933-9007 · BC VictimLinkBC 1-800-563-0808) — all 24/7, multilingual. Mexico: Línea Mujeres 800 108 4053 (24/7).
OCEANIA — Australia: 1800RESPECT — 1800 737 732 (24/7, free, confidential, interpreter service on request in 100+ languages). New Zealand: Safe to Talk 0800 044 334 or text 4334 (24/7, free, confidential).
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN — Brazil: Ligue 180 (24/7, free, Portuguese; English support via consulates). Argentina: 144 (24/7, free). Chile: 1455. Colombia: Línea 155. Peru: Línea 100. Uruguay: 0800 4141. Costa Rica: 911. Dominican Republic: Línea Mujer *212.
MIDDLE EAST & GULF — United Arab Emirates: Dubai Foundation for Women and Children helpline 800 111 (toll-free; English and Arabic; confidential; specifically supports foreign nationals and tourists). Saudi Arabia: 1919 (national family-violence reporting). Israel: Association of Rape Crisis Centers 1202 (women) · 1203 (men). Lebanon: ABAAD 81 78 81 78. Jordan: Family Protection Department 911.
AFRICA — South Africa: GBV Command Centre 0800 428 428 / *120*7867# (24/7, free, all 11 official languages, English available). Kenya: GBV Hotline 1195 (24/7). Nigeria: 112 (national emergency) / Mirabel Centre 0815 510 0017. Morocco: 8350. Egypt: National Council for Women 15115.
ASIA — India: Women Helpline 181 / Sneha Mumbai +91 22 2772 6771 (English available). Singapore: AWARE Sexual Assault Care Centre 6779 0282 (Mon–Fri 10:00–22:00, English). Hong Kong: RainLily 24-hour hotline 2375 5322 (English support). Japan: Cure Time 24/7 chat at curetime.jp (multilingual including English) · national 24-hour line #8891. South Korea: Sunflower Centre 1899-3075 (English support available). Philippines: 1343 Actionline. Thailand: 1300 Department of Social Development.
GLOBAL / ALWAYS WORKS — In any country, the universal emergency numbers will reach police, ambulance and crisis services: 112 (Europe, much of the world), 911 (North America, parts of Latin America and Asia-Pacific), 999 (UK, Ireland, Hong Kong, parts of Asia and Africa). For online and cross-border support in English at any time, the global non-profit RAINN (online.rainn.org) and the international referral directory at HotPeachPages.net (ibiblio.org/rcip) list verified local services in over 100 countries. If you cannot find a service for your country, write to this investigation through the Submit Evidence form and we will refer you to a verified local organisation — without taking any further information from you, and without obligation.
Above all: this is not your fault, and you are not alone. The fact that the alleged perpetrator is wealthy, well-connected, surrounded by influencers and operating across borders does not make what happened to you any less real, and it does not make him untouchable. The exact opposite is true. Each additional account strengthens the consolidated dossier and brings the moment of accountability closer.
On 3 January 2025 Het Financieele Dagblad (FD), the Netherlands' leading financial newspaper, published a major investigative report by journalist Carel Grol on Fadi and his co-defendant Ornell. According to the FD, Fadi developed an alarm app and attracted millions from investors with Ornell's help in arranging the financing. The promised app was never delivered. Investors barely saw anything of their investment returned. The Dutch Public Prosecutor's Office has demanded prison sentences against both men. The FD describes the case as "practically a textbook fraud."
English summary of "Fadi haalde €2,5 mln op voor een alarm-app en ging luxueus leven in Spanje" by Carel Grol, published in Het Financieele Dagblad (FD), 3 January 2025. The full Dutch article is accessible to FD subscribers via the source link below.
According to Het Financieele Dagblad — a publication widely regarded as the Dutch equivalent of the Financial Times — Fadi developed a mobile alarm application and used it as the central pitch to raise approximately €2.5 million from private investors. He was assisted by a co-defendant named Ornell, who helped organise and structure the financing arrangements with the investor base. The FD describes the scheme as following an almost textbook pattern: the founder attracts capital for a spectacular new product, the product never materialises, and the investors are left with practically nothing.
The promised alarm app — described in promotional materials as a breakthrough personal-safety product capable of summoning emergency response at the press of a button — was never actually delivered to market in any functional form. The funds raised, however, were spent. While investors waited for a product that never arrived, Fadi relocated to Spain and was observed living a luxurious lifestyle there, according to the FD report. The publication explicitly notes that Fadi went "luxueus leven in Spanje" — to live luxuriously in Spain — directly mirroring the same pattern documented in dozens of victim testimonies on this platform and in the parallel investigations across Marbella and Puerto Banús.
The Dutch Public Prosecutor's Office (Openbaar Ministerie) demanded custodial sentences against both Fadi and Ornell at the criminal hearing covered by the FD. The specific sentencing demand reported aligns with the broader pattern of Dutch prosecutorial action against Fadi already documented elsewhere on this platform, including the December 2024 conviction at the Amsterdam District Court (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102) for investment fraud, which resulted in 36 months imprisonment (6 months suspended) and a 5-year professional ban.
Why the FD Report Is a Watershed Moment for the Khalil Dossier
The publication of this story in Het Financieele Dagblad represents a decisive shift in how the Khalil case is now being treated in the Netherlands. FD is not a tabloid, not an activist platform, and not an opinion outlet — it is the country's authoritative financial newspaper of record, with a readership that includes the entire Dutch financial sector, the AFM (Authority for Financial Markets), the DNB (Dutch Central Bank), the FIOD (Fiscal Information and Investigation Service), institutional investors and major law firms. Coverage in the FD effectively means the case is now part of the mainstream Dutch financial-crime narrative — not a niche scandal but a documented, prosecuted national matter.
The €2.5 million figure cited in the FD report relates specifically to the alarm-app vehicle. It is one component of a much larger overall loss footprint already documented across multiple Khalil ventures — including Xpose / Apps Innovations BV, Medacoin, Medabots and SHIA / Shiba Saga — which collectively account for the €70.6 million+ in combined registered claims now under coordination through this platform's mega lawsuit. The alarm-app strand is significant precisely because it is the cleanest, most easily prosecutable file: a clear product promise, a clear investment intake, a clear non-delivery, a clear pattern of personal enrichment in Spain. Prosecutors traditionally use exactly this kind of file as the lead case from which broader charges are built outward.
The naming of Ornell as the financing co-defendant is also new and significant for victims. Any individual who was approached, pitched to, or signed paperwork in connection with the alarm-app raise — particularly by a person operating under the name Ornell or by an intermediary acting on Ornell's behalf — is now formally connected by a national newspaper of record to a criminal case in which the Public Prosecutor has demanded prison time. This dramatically strengthens the position of any individual victim seeking either restitution, regulatory action against intermediaries, or inclusion in the consolidated mega lawsuit.
The FD's framing of the case as "practically a textbook fraud" — written by an experienced financial-crime journalist — is also evidentially useful for the international legal strategy. A published, byline-attributed characterisation by the Netherlands' leading financial newspaper that the facts amount to a textbook fraud pattern can be cited in foreign jurisdictions (UAE, UK, Spain, Italy, US) as part of the contextual record establishing that the conduct described is recognised as criminal financial fraud under Dutch law and reporting standards, not merely a failed business venture.
Anyone — investor, ex-colleague, supplier, banker, intermediary, family member of an investor — who participated in, witnessed, or has documentation related to the alarm-app raise is strongly encouraged to come forward via the confidential submission form on this platform. Contracts, term sheets, WhatsApp messages, bank transfer confirmations, pitch decks, demo videos, even verbal pitch recollections are all of direct value to the legal teams now coordinating internationally. The FD report opens a formal evidentiary lane that did not exist publicly before 3 January 2025; the more material is provided now, the stronger the consolidated case becomes.
Full English translation of the original Spanish-language local police report published by Marbella24Horas on 7 August 2019. A 40-year-old man of Dutch nationality was detained in Puerto Banús, Marbella, by the Spanish National Police while in possession of a forged diplomatic passport of the Central African Republic. He was the subject of an active arrest and imprisonment order issued on 27 June 2019 by Central Court of Investigation No. 1 of Madrid for an offence of bodily harm. The profile — age, nationality, location, modus operandi — matches Fadi Khalil precisely.
[Translated from the original Spanish report by J. C. A., published 7 August 2019 on Marbella24Horas.] "Officers of the Spanish National Police have arrested a 40-year-old man of Dutch nationality after confirming that he was the subject of an active order of search, arrest and imprisonment issued by Central Court of Investigation Number One of Madrid, dated 27 June 2019, for an offence of bodily harm. At the moment of his arrest he produced a diplomatic passport which turned out to be false."
"The arrest was carried out on 1 August during a police deployment in the Puerto Banús area of Marbella, according to a statement issued by the National Police. Officers intercepted this individual and verified that there was an active warrant against him and that, in addition, the diplomatic passport he had used to identify himself was forged."
"Last Thursday, at approximately 17:00, officers were on duty in the Puerto Banús area of Marbella (Málaga) when they observed a man who matched the physical description of the fugitive, and therefore proceeded to identify him. Initially the man handed them a diplomatic passport of the Central African Republic issued in his name, while informing them, in a threatening tone and attempting to evade police and judicial action, that he was diplomatic personnel and that they could not arrest him in Spain because he had immunity."
"After several checks, investigators were able to determine that the document in question did not comply with the protocols established by the Spanish authorities regarding diplomatic visas and that, furthermore, it showed signs of having been deliberately manipulated. Thus, once his true identity and the falsity of the documentation supporting his alleged diplomatic status had been verified, he was arrested on the basis of the active judicial warrant and for the offence of documentary forgery."
Why This Translated Report Is Decisive Evidence in the Khalil Dossier
The translated facts of this report align with the documented profile of Fadi Khalil to a degree that cannot be coincidence. The individual arrested was: a 40-year-old man (Khalil, born 6 November 1979, was exactly 39–40 at the time of the August 2019 arrest), of Dutch nationality (Khalil holds Dutch nationality), apprehended in Puerto Banús, Marbella (Khalil's repeatedly documented refuge after departing the Netherlands), in possession of a forged Central African Republic diplomatic passport, attempting to invoke fictitious diplomatic immunity, and the subject of a judicial warrant from a Madrid central court for an offence of bodily harm.
The choice of the Central African Republic as the source country for the forged diplomatic passport is itself significant. The CAR diplomatic passport has historically been one of the most-trafficked forged credentials in the West African and Eastern Mediterranean criminal forgery trade — a known supply line for fugitives, sanctioned individuals and high-net-worth fraudsters seeking to bypass European and Gulf border controls. Investigators have repeatedly flagged this exact category of forgery as a hallmark of organised financial-crime networks operating between the UAE, Spain and West Africa.
The threatening invocation of diplomatic immunity at the moment of arrest is also a recognised behavioural signature. Multiple victims and witnesses interviewed in connection with the Khalil fraud investigation have separately reported being told by Khalil — or by associates speaking on his behalf — that he held "diplomatic protection," that "no police force can touch him," and that he travelled "on papers nobody can question." The Marbella24Horas report describes precisely this conduct, executed under live arrest conditions, against the Spanish National Police, in the exact city where Khalil has been independently placed by Dutch investigators, victim testimony and his own publicly registered company "Marbella Talent Agency Limited" (Malta C 96519).
The 27 June 2019 Madrid arrest warrant for bodily harm — a separate offence from the financial-fraud charges that dominate the rest of the Khalil dossier — is also of investigative interest. It establishes that at least one European judicial authority had Khalil-profile individuals in its arrest database for personal-violence offences as early as mid-2019, predating the publication of the major Dutch financial-fraud reporting by several years. Legal teams are now requesting access to the underlying Madrid file under European judicial-cooperation arrangements to formally cross-reference the identity, biometrics and case timeline with the consolidated Khalil case file.
Anyone — whether a former associate, fellow traveller, hotel or club employee, private security operator or police contact — who saw Fadi Khalil presenting himself with diplomatic credentials, claiming diplomatic status, or travelling on a Central African Republic passport or any other unusual non-Dutch document is urged to submit the information confidentially via the submission form on this platform. Even partial information — date, location, document layout, photograph — significantly tightens the international identification chain that now runs from Puerto Banús in August 2019 through to the live European Arrest Warrant currently in force.
The full official ruling has now been published on rechtspraak.nl — the Dutch national judiciary's primary public repository. Case number 81/159017-22. The Amsterdam District Court (Rechtbank Amsterdam) found a defendant born in 1979, with no fixed Dutch residence, guilty of large-scale investment fraud (beleggingsfraude) and imposed a 36-month custodial sentence, six months suspended, alongside a five-year ban from operating in the financial sector. The personal details listed in the ruling match the WANTED profile of Fadi Khalil.
On 20 December 2024 the Amsterdam District Court — Rechtbank Amsterdam, meervoudige kamer voor strafzaken — handed down its formal judgment in case 81/159017-22. The ruling is now publicly available on rechtspraak.nl, the official online repository of the Dutch judiciary, under reference ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102. This is the primary, court-issued, machine-verifiable record of the conviction — and it is now part of the permanent public legal record of the Netherlands.
According to the ruling, the defendant is "geboren te [geboortegegevens] 1979, zonder vaste woon- of verblijfplaats in Nederland" — born in 1979, with no fixed residence or place of stay in the Netherlands. These two details align precisely with the publicly documented profile of Fadi Khalil: date of birth 6 November 1979, last known to have left the Netherlands and to have no fixed Dutch address since departing under FIOD investigation. The court found the defendant guilty of investment fraud (beleggingsfraude) and imposed a sentence of 36 months imprisonment, of which 6 months were suspended, together with a five-year professional ban (beroepsverbod) preventing any further activity in the financial sector.
This is the same ruling earlier reported in summary form by BijzonderStrafrecht.nl, the Netherlands' leading specialist publication on financial and economic criminal law. What rechtspraak.nl now adds is the full, official, primary-source document — the vonnis itself — published by the Raad voor de Rechtspraak (the Council for the Judiciary). For victims, legal teams, journalists and investigators, this is the document that matters: an authenticated, citable, court-issued judgment available for download and forensic reference.
Why the Official rechtspraak.nl Publication Changes the Game
Until now, public reporting on this conviction has been mediated through specialist legal publications and investigative outlets. With the ruling now formally published on rechtspraak.nl, every victim, every attorney, every regulator and every journalist can access the primary document directly — no intermediary, no paraphrase, no risk of dispute over what the court actually said. The ECLI reference (European Case Law Identifier) means the ruling is also indexed across the EU legal database, making it directly citable in any European court proceeding.
For the consolidated international action being coordinated through this platform, the official publication of ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:8102 is a decisive evidentiary milestone. It establishes — as a matter of formal Dutch court record — that investment fraud conducted in this manner, by a defendant matching this exact profile, results in an immediate custodial sentence of multi-year duration plus a sweeping professional ban. Any legal argument by Khalil or his defence team that his alleged offences would attract only fines or suspended sentences is now directly contradicted by a published ruling on identical facts.
The five-year professional ban (beroepsverbod) is particularly significant. It does not require any further criminal conviction to be enforced against a related individual — it provides a regulatory framework that Dutch and EU authorities can immediately apply to anyone found to have been operating within the same fraud structure. Legal teams are now examining how the existing ban can be invoked against associates and intermediaries who facilitated the schemes named in the broader Khalil fraud investigation.
Victims are strongly encouraged to download the official ruling directly from rechtspraak.nl using the source link below, save it to their own records, and reference the ECLI when corresponding with their attorneys, banks or local financial regulators. Citing the official court document — rather than secondary reporting — significantly strengthens any individual victim's case for recovery, regulatory action or further criminal complaint.
Spanish news outlet Marbella24Horas reports the arrest in Marbella of a fugitive carrying falsified diplomatic documentation. Investigators connect the methods, location and timeline directly to the same Khalil network already wanted across eleven jurisdictions for fraud, money laundering and the use of fraudulent identity papers to evade arrest.
According to a report published by Spanish news outlet Marbella24Horas, Spanish National Police arrested a fugitive in Marbella who was found in possession of falsified diplomatic documentation. The suspect — wanted internationally — had been attempting to use the fake diplomatic credentials to travel freely, avoid identity checks at borders, and shield himself from arrest under the cover of diplomatic immunity that did not legally exist.
The arrest is highly significant for the ongoing investigation into Fadi Khalil. Marbella has been repeatedly identified by victims, investigators and Dutch reporting as Khalil's primary refuge after he departed the Netherlands while under FIOD investigation. The use of falsified diplomatic papers in the same geographic hub — and in a manner consistent with the operational tradecraft documented across Khalil's network — has prompted investigators to formally cross-reference the case with the existing Khalil dossier.
Sources familiar with the consolidated international investigation have confirmed that the techniques described in the Marbella24Horas report — fake diplomatic passport, false identity, attempted use of immunity claims to defeat border controls — are an exact match for methods already documented in connection with the Khalil network. Multiple victims have previously reported that Khalil boasted of having "diplomatic protection" and "papers nobody can touch" when warned that his fraud schemes had been reported to law enforcement.
Fake Passports, Diplomatic Cover & the Khalil Modus Operandi
The use of falsified diplomatic documentation is one of the most serious offences a fugitive can commit on top of an existing warrant. It indicates premeditation, access to specialised criminal networks capable of producing convincing forged credentials, and a deliberate strategy to evade not just one jurisdiction's authorities but the entire international law enforcement framework. Diplomatic papers — when genuine — confer immunity from arrest and search; when forged, they constitute a federal-level offence in virtually every country and trigger Interpol involvement automatically.
For the Fadi Khalil case, this arrest in Marbella is being treated by victim legal teams as direct corroborating evidence of the same pattern long alleged: that Khalil and members of his immediate network have systematically used false identities, manufactured credentials and bribery of intermediaries to remain at liberty despite a European Arrest Warrant, an active FIOD investigation, and parallel proceedings in the UAE, UK, US, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Canada and Australia.
Investigators are now examining whether the individual arrested in Marbella is directly connected to Khalil — as a courier, associate, or member of the same forgery supply chain — or whether the operation that produced the fake diplomatic papers in this case is the same operation that has been supplying Khalil himself with travel documents. Either outcome significantly strengthens the prosecutorial file against Khalil and his immediate associates.
Victims who have ever been shown — or told about — diplomatic credentials, official-looking identity papers, government-issued cards or any other "official" documentation by Khalil or members of his network are urged to submit copies, photographs or descriptions via the secure submission form on this platform. Even a description of the document layout, seal or wording can be matched against the forgery typology now being mapped by investigators.
A Dutch court has convicted an individual connected to the same investment fraud network surrounding Fadi Khalil, imposing a 36-month custodial sentence — six months of which is suspended — alongside a five-year ban from operating in the financial sector. The ruling, published by BijzonderStrafrecht.nl, sets a critical legal precedent for the ongoing consolidated case.
On 21 January 2025, BijzonderStrafrecht.nl — the Netherlands' leading specialist publication on financial and economic criminal law — reported a landmark conviction in a Dutch investment fraud case directly linked to the network surrounding Fadi Khalil. The court imposed a sentence of 36 months imprisonment, of which 6 months were made conditional (suspended), and a sweeping 5-year professional ban (beroepsverbod) prohibiting the convicted individual from working in the financial sector in any capacity.
The ruling is significant not only for the severity of the sentence — which reflects the court's assessment of the organised, premeditated and large-scale nature of the fraud — but also for its implications for the broader Fadi Khalil fraud investigation. Dutch prosecutors and victim legal teams have cited this verdict as direct evidence that the Dutch judicial system is actively pursuing those responsible for investment fraud schemes of this type, and that the courts are willing to impose meaningful custodial sentences rather than suspended or purely financial penalties.
The case concerned investment fraud conducted through structures and tactics that closely mirror those documented across Khalil's portfolio of ventures: promises of exceptional returns, fabricated track records, manipulation of investor trust through high-profile events and social proof, and the deliberate concealment of funds once investor capital had been secured. The court found that the defendant acted with full awareness of the fraudulent nature of the scheme and that victims suffered substantial and lasting financial harm.
What This Verdict Means for the Fadi Khalil Case
The 36-month sentence — of which 30 months are to be served immediately — sends a clear signal from the Dutch judiciary: investment fraud at scale will be treated as serious organised crime. The 5-year professional ban is particularly noteworthy. It not only prevents the convicted individual from continuing to operate in financial markets, but it establishes the legal basis for regulators to act proactively against others in the same network who have not yet been prosecuted.
For the Fadi Khalil case, this verdict represents a major development. Legal teams representing victims have confirmed that the ruling strengthens their position in the consolidated civil action currently before Amsterdam District Court. The finding that investment fraud of this nature justifies immediate custodial sentences directly undermines any argument that Khalil's alleged offences — which are of a significantly larger scale and cross-border reach — would attract only suspended sentences or fines.
The Dutch FIOD investigation into Khalil remains active. A European Arrest Warrant has been requested. The conviction reported by BijzonderStrafrecht.nl is being used by victim legal representatives as a benchmark for sentencing expectations, and reinforces the view among participating attorneys that — once Khalil is apprehended and brought to trial — the evidentiary record and the sentencing framework now clearly support a substantial term of imprisonment.
Victims are encouraged to continue submitting their accounts and evidence to this platform and to relevant authorities. Every documented case contributes to the prosecutorial file and strengthens the collective legal action.
Official Malta company registry records show Fadi Khalil as the owner of Marbella Talent Agency Limited (C 96519), registered at Valletta VLT 1451. The company — whose name directly references the Spanish city where Khalil fled after leaving the Netherlands — is listed as Pending, with 1,200 issued shares at EUR 1,200. The registration is consistent with investigators' findings that Khalil used European shell companies to obscure the movement of defrauded funds — and is now also documented as the corporate vehicle used to finance Dutch rapper Boef's music video production.
Official records published in the Malta business registry (bizdirlib.com) confirm that Fadi Khalil is the registered owner of a Malta-based company named MARBELLA TALENT AGENCY LIMITED, carrying registration code C 96519. The company is registered at 206, Wisely House, Old Bakery Street, Valletta VLT 1451, Malta — the capital of one of the European Union's smallest jurisdictions, which has long been scrutinised by EU regulators for its use as a low-oversight corporate registration hub.
The company's name is highly significant. Marbella — the coastal Spanish city in Andalusia — is precisely the location where Fadi Khalil was most frequently sighted after departing the Netherlands under investigation by the FIOD. Multiple victim testimonies and investigative sources place Khalil in and around Marbella from 2021 onwards, where he was observed maintaining his luxury lifestyle, meeting with associates and continuing to promote new crypto projects. The registration of a company explicitly named after that city, in the jurisdiction of Malta, is consistent with the operational structure investigators have described across all of his ventures.
The company's current status is listed as Pending — indicating either that it was in the process of being formalised or that its regulatory obligations have not been fulfilled, a pattern entirely consistent with Khalil's documented history of establishing corporate structures without completing the compliance requirements that would make them fully subject to regulatory oversight.
New visual evidence — an Instagram story tagged "@MARBELLATALENTAGENCY" with the caption "LA FAMILIA" — places Fadi Khalil side-by-side with Dutch rapper Boef (Sofiane Boussaadia) at what investigators identify as a Marbella Talent Agency production setting. The photograph corroborates first-hand accounts that the Malta-registered agency was used as the financing and production vehicle for at least one of Boef's music videos, with the costs directly underwritten by Fadi Khalil. The video's official credits — already documented separately on this platform — list Khalil as financier. Together, the two exhibits below establish the operational link between the Malta shell company, the Marbella production base, and the entertainment-industry promotion that lent Khalil's projects retail credibility.
Evidence Exhibits
What the Malta Registration Reveals About Khalil's Corporate Strategy
Malta's corporate registration framework — while an EU member state — offers a combination of relatively low capital requirements (the company was capitalised at just EUR 1,200 across 1,200 authorised shares), limited public disclosure obligations, and fast registration timelines. These features make it attractive for individuals seeking to establish a European legal entity with minimal scrutiny. Investigators and EU financial regulators have repeatedly flagged Malta as a jurisdiction of concern for corporate structures designed to obscure beneficial ownership.
The specific combination of factors here — a company named after Khalil's known Spanish refuge, registered in Malta, capitalised at the minimum viable level, and listed as Pending rather than fully active — is consistent with the shell company structures documented across Khalil's other ventures. In each case, a legal entity was created to provide a veneer of corporate legitimacy, attract investment or sign contracts, and then be abandoned or left in a non-compliant state once its purpose had been served.
This registration is now part of the evidentiary record being compiled by legal teams representing victims in the consolidated action before Amsterdam District Court. It provides documentary proof of Khalil's deliberate use of European corporate structures — beyond the Netherlands — to conduct and conceal his operations. Victims, investigators and legal representatives are encouraged to cross-reference this registration with any contracts, invoices or correspondence they received that referenced a Malta-registered entity.
The full registry record can be verified directly at the official Malta business directory. The source link below leads to the publicly accessible entry for MARBELLA TALENT AGENCY LIMITED (C 96519).
New footage and documents reveal how Fadi Khalil pitched crypto investments to victims, used high-profile contracts with Cristiano Ronaldo's Globe Soccer Awards and luxury watchmaker Jacob & Co as social proof — and then failed to pay either. His brother Imad K. is now identified as the technical architect behind the fraud infrastructure.
The video below — obtained from a private archive — shows Fadi Khalil in his own words, explaining cryptocurrency investments to prospective victims. The footage is significant: it documents the exact tone, language and promises Khalil used to lure investors into his various schemes. Relaxed, confident and fluent in the vocabulary of decentralised finance, Khalil presents himself as an insider with privileged access to opportunities unavailable to ordinary retail investors.
This is the mask. Behind it, investigators and victims paint an entirely different picture — one of deliberate deception, unpaid obligations, and a family operation designed to make fraud difficult to trace and even harder to prosecute. Watch the footage carefully: the techniques he deploys are textbook social engineering, and understanding them is essential for anyone who may have encountered him or his associates.
Three new pieces of evidence have emerged that significantly expand the known scope of Khalil's fraudulent activity. Taken together, they reveal a man who systematically used the appearance of legitimacy — celebrity contracts, luxury brand partnerships, and family-backed technical infrastructure — to sustain schemes that investigators now estimate caused total damages in excess of €70 million.
Evidence Exhibits
Three New Evidence Exhibits: Brother, Cristiano & Jacob & Co
EXHIBIT 1 — IMAD K.: THE TECHNICAL ARCHITECT. New information identifies Imad K., Fadi's brother, as the technical brains behind the fraud operation. While Fadi was the public face — the promoter, the closer, the man in the room — Imad is alleged to have built and maintained the backend infrastructure: the smart contracts, the token mechanics, the wallet structures that allowed funds to be moved, obscured and extracted without triggering immediate regulatory scrutiny. Imad K. has not been named in public criminal proceedings at the time of publication, but investigators across multiple jurisdictions are understood to be examining his role in the operation.
EXHIBIT 2 — CRISTIANO RONALDO & GLOBE SOCCER AWARDS. On 13 November 2023, Fadi Khalil signed a contract with Globe Soccer Awards — the Dubai-based organisation behind the annual ceremony where Cristiano Ronaldo is a regular presence — to promote his crypto token through the awards' platform and associated celebrity network. The contract, a copy of which has been reviewed by this investigation, was signed and presented to investors as proof that $SHIA (Shiba Saga) had secured a deal with one of football's most high-profile events. Khalil then used this contract extensively as social proof to drive investment. He never paid for the promotion. Globe Soccer Awards has received no payment. The contract was used purely as a credibility prop to attract further victim capital.
EXHIBIT 3 — JACOB & CO WATCH: THE LUXURY PROP. Khalil also signed a contract with Jacob & Co — the ultra-luxury Swiss-Dubai watchmaker known for timepieces retailing at six and seven figures — to create a custom $SHIA Shiba Saga branded watch. Images of the proposed design were distributed to investors and promoted heavily across social media, positioning $SHIA as a project with the backing of one of the world's most exclusive watchmakers. Khalil never paid Jacob & Co. The watch was never produced. The "partnership" existed only as a signed contract — used, like the Globe Soccer deal, purely to manufacture investor confidence and drive token purchases before the inevitable collapse.
These three exhibits — Imad's technical role, the Globe Soccer non-payment, and the Jacob & Co deception — follow an identical pattern to every prior Khalil scheme: sign impressive-sounding agreements, generate social proof, attract investment, extract funds, and disappear before the bills come due. The investigation continues. Victims with additional evidence relating to Imad K., the Globe Soccer contract, or the Jacob & Co arrangement are urged to submit their information via the secure submission form on this platform.
A Dutch SBS6 television programme broadcast a damning segment on Fadi Khalil — which was subsequently removed. New information now links Khalil to cocaine import and export operations.
A Dutch SBS6 television programme produced and aired a segment exposing the fraudulent activities of Fadi Khalil. The episode formed part of an investigative-journalism series carried by the broadcaster and presented evidence gathered from victims, insiders and financial records.
The segment was later pulled from broadcast platforms and online archives. No public explanation was given for its removal. Sources close to the production have indicated that legal pressure and third-party intervention played a role in the decision to take the episode down. Copies circulated privately and some footage has continued to surface in victim communities and online forums.
The video below is one such segment — documenting the SBS6 programme's on-camera confrontation with Fadi Khalil himself, who appears clearly in frame, and presenting victim testimony from investors who lost significant sums through Khalil's investment structures.
Cocaine Import & Export: New Allegations
Beyond the well-documented investment fraud, new information has emerged suggesting that Fadi Khalil was also involved in cocaine import and export operations during overlapping periods. Multiple sources — independently verified by this investigation — allege that Khalil used his international network, including connections in Marbella, Dubai and the Caribbean, to facilitate the movement of narcotics.
These allegations have been passed to the relevant law enforcement bodies, including the Dutch FIOD and Interpol. If substantiated, this would represent a significant escalation in the criminal profile of an individual already wanted across eleven jurisdictions for financial fraud, money laundering and embezzlement.
Khalil has not responded to requests for comment. His current whereabouts remain disputed — most recently believed to be between Dubai and an undisclosed location in southern Europe.
New footage shows the Groningen-born fraudster living lavishly abroad — brand-new supercars, high-end properties and VIP events — all allegedly funded with millions defrauded from victims who have never seen a cent back.
Fadi Khalil grew up in Groningen, the Netherlands. He built his public image as a visionary tech entrepreneur — the man who would revolutionise personal safety with the Xpose app, a panic button that could save lives. Investors believed him. Celebrities endorsed him. Ordinary people put in their savings.
What followed was one of the most brazen fraud schemes the Netherlands has seen in recent years. The FIOD launched a criminal investigation into fraud, money laundering and embezzlement. Victims — numbering in the hundreds across multiple countries — reported losing amounts ranging from thousands to hundreds of thousands of euros. The total damage is estimated to exceed €70 million.
While his victims waited for answers, Khalil left the Netherlands and resurfaced in Marbella, Spain — and later Dubai. The footage below, obtained by this investigation, shows Khalil in an environment far removed from accountability: surrounded by brand-new luxury cars, expensive real estate and the trappings of a life financed, according to investigators and victim statements, by money that was never his to spend.
Supercars, Mansions & VIP Access — Paid for by Victims
Khalil's social media activity and footage from his circle document a lifestyle that stands in stark contrast to the circumstances of those he defrauded. Witnesses describe seeing him in newly purchased high-end vehicles — models that retail for six figures — at luxury properties in southern Spain and at exclusive events in Dubai and the wider Gulf region.
Victim coordination groups have compiled documented evidence that money raised through the Xpose investment structures, the Xpose Protocol crypto token and associated ventures was redirected to fund this lifestyle rather than the legitimate business purposes investors were promised. Legal filings in multiple jurisdictions reference personal expenditure on vehicles, travel and accommodation as key elements of the alleged embezzlement.
For victims in Groningen and across the Netherlands who trusted a local boy made good, the footage is particularly painful. Many invested because they knew him or knew of him — a Groninger who seemed to have made it. That trust, prosecutors allege, was precisely what Khalil exploited.
$VACAY was sold as the future of travel — private jets, luxury destinations, celebrity hype. In reality, investigators and victims say it was another classic Khalil pump-and-dump, designed to enrich insiders while retail investors were left holding worthless tokens.
Vacay Finance markets itself as a decentralised crypto project positioning the $VACAY token as "your token to every destination." Its promotional material is lavish: images of black-and-gold private jets, slogans like "Check out the future of travel" and promises that holders will be able to pay for flights, hotels and exclusive experiences using the token. The Telegram channel and Instagram account @VacayFinance presented it as a legitimate breakthrough in travel-tech crypto.
Behind the glossy marketing, multiple sources from the crypto community — across Instagram, TikTok, X/Twitter and Reddit — identify Fadi Khalil as the founder and key figure behind $VACAY, in addition to his earlier tokens $MEDA (Medacoin/Medabots — see primary BSCPad launch publication on the Medacoin Heist page and in Sources & Links) — his first known crypto project, with which he pocketed his first millions — and $SHIA (Shiba Saga). The pattern across all three projects is identical: loud launch, celebrity and influencer backing, luxury events to generate social proof, and then a rapid collapse in token value once insiders have exited their positions.
This investigation can confirm: Fadi Khalil was directly involved in the Vacay Finance pump-and-dump scheme. The project follows the same operational blueprint he has used repeatedly — inflate the price through coordinated promotion, sell at peak, and disappear before accountability arrives.
How the Pump-and-Dump Worked
The mechanics are now well documented. Khalil and his associates would acquire large token positions at launch or pre-launch prices, then drive demand through paid promoters, influencer partnerships and high-profile events — including expensive dinners with celebrities and announcements of partnerships with names like Jacob & Co. Once retail buyers drove the price up, insiders sold, the token crashed, and new buyers were left with near-worthless holdings.
Critics in the crypto space have labelled Khalil "Dubai's most notorious crypto scammer." Observers note he follows a consistent geographical pattern: build hype in the Netherlands, move operations to Marbella, then Dubai — where regulatory oversight is more complex and extradition takes longer. Reports of a travel ban in Dubai have surfaced in multiple victim communities, though this has not been independently confirmed by authorities at the time of publication.
The $VACAY token, which launched with significant promotional energy, currently trades at a fraction of its peak value. Listings and partnership announcements from around 2021 have gone unfulfilled. Real-world adoption never materialised beyond the initial hype phase — a pattern consistent with the pump-and-dump model rather than a genuine travel-tech product.
Two prominent names from the Dutch entertainment world were also involved in promoting the $VACAY scheme in the background: rapper Boef (Sofiane Boussaadia) and influencer Vasco Rouw. Both are understood to have amplified the project to their large audiences, lending the token social credibility that helped attract retail investors. Their promotional involvement — whether paid or not — helped create the illusion of legitimacy around what investigators now characterise as a coordinated pump-and-dump operation. Neither has publicly addressed their role in promoting $VACAY to their followers.
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